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Introduction 
 
The thesis centres on the problem of conflict of interest in the public sector analysed 
through policy documents of the EU and the OECD. The very fact of its persistence and 
continuous character demand attention1. In order to search for explanations, first, the 
concept itself was studied; second, the main developments within the public 
administration of European states of the same period were observed; on the basis of 
information gathered, data was selected for further investigation. The choice fell on the 
OECD, the EU and their subsidiary organisations, as well as an academic study (the 
European Commission’s delegated assignment for making a comparative research). An 
attempt is made to discover the presentation, explanation, and possible resolution of the 
conflict of interest problem through data from these organisations. 
 
The research considers the period from the 1990s until 2010, when the majority of 
western democratic countries were practising new administrative methods borrowed 
from the business administration exercised in the private sector. This major change in 
European governance is brought to light in order to check for possible correlations with 
the conflict of interest recommendations and the empirical study commissioned by the 
EU. The success of those reforms in terms of the effective and efficient administration 
of public affairs is still debated; however, its irreconcilable impact on public 
administration cannot be underestimated. The first task is to investigate the emerging 
dominant themes and principles that have shaped the subsequent contextual features of 
European governance; then, key findings will be compared with the conflict of interest 
data for possible correlation.  For example, conceptual, ideological and normative 
underpinnings used in the data will be paralleled with the dominant themes, aspirations 
and objectives expressed in public governance. This will illustrate the ideological 
orientation, conformity and adjustability of the conflict of interest data within the larger 
public administrative framework. Such a comparison might delineate key variables with 
the capacity to explain the persistence of the conflict of interest problem, and its strong 
presence within public sector governance. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Corporate!Europe!Observatory!(2011)!!!!!Federal!Ethics!Report!(2009).!
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To accomplish this, task two papers are chosen: 1) The ‘European Principles for Public 
Administration’ (OECD, 1999) - the main contributors to this document were the 
subsidiary agencies, SIGMA and PUMA, under the patronage of the OECD and EU, 
and 2) the ‘Commission of European Communities’ paper popularly known as 
‘European Governance, A White Paper’ (COM, 2001). With the help of this data, the 
EU’s administrative context will be compared with the conflict of interest policy 
guidelines (OECD, 2003) and an empirical study (Salminen et al., 2007).  
 
These two latter papers directly deal with the conflict of interest problem in public 
administration: 1) ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Services’ (OECD, 
(2003), represents the OECD’s policy guidelines and recommendations; and 2) 
‘Regulating Conflict of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ 
(Salminen et al., 2007), is a comparative study of the rules and standards of professional 
ethics for holders of public office in the EU-27 and EU institutions. The conflict of 
interest data was selected on the basis of several aspects: first, the appropriate period; 
second, the text’s authoritative character (familiarity and applicability of the 
recommendations among European countries); and third, a broad and detailed 
description of the state of affairs regarding conflict of interest within the EU. This was 
accomplished through the empirical study administered by several independent bodies 
commissioned by the EU (Salminen et al., 2007).   
 
Thus, the two initial papers describe the European administrative environment with its 
fundamental principles and legal norms. They represent the framework in which 
manifestations of conflict of interest reside, which is important for controlling possible 
activators, or causative agents; and the two later works deal with the problem at stake, 
in other words, the issue of conflict of interest.  
 
The main research questions of the thesis are: How is the problem of conflict of 
interest represented by the OECD and EU? And how consistent are they with the 
broader EU administrative framework2?  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!As!described!by!the!data!used!in!this!thesis!(‘European!Principles!for!Public!Administration’!(1999);!‘European!Governance,!A!White!Paper’!(2001)).!!
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The Critical Management Study (CMS) is chosen as a theoretical framework for this 
research. Because of its widespread streams and accommodating character, the 
poststructuralist branch is taken as an additional focus. Carol Bacchi’s WPR (Bacchi, 
2009) methodology of policy analysis shares to a large extent a poststructuralist 
orientation based on Michael Foucault’s insights. For this reason, it is used as an 
additional explanatory device to supplement the core theoretical underpinning of the 
Critical Management Study, and the main methodological tool. The analysis proceeds 
through the six staple questions that the author advises should be followed continuously 
when dealing with policy texts.  
 
To summarise the structure of the thesis, first the concept of conflict of interest and 
closely related themes are elaborated, followed by the theoretical framework. Then the 
main developments within the public administration of European states are observed; in 
other words, the context of the public sector reform is presented. This is followed by the 
data representation and methodological description, and finally, the analysis and 
conclusion.  
 
1. The Conflict of Interest  
 
The concept of conflict of interest, as it is understood today, is almost half a century 
old: in effect, most prominent thinkers in business ethics, such as Aristotle, Kant, and 
J.S. Mill did not refer to it at all. Logically it can be assumed that this concept appeared 
in response to new developments in our world and our political culture that had no 
analogy in history (Norman & MacDonald, 2009, p.2). However, poststructuralists 
oppose such an argument, believing that any phenomenon has a tendency to reappear 
within modern discourses with renewed vigour as a result of wider normative changes 
(Foucault, 1979 in Bacchi 2009, p.9).  
  
The first contemporary philosophical encounters with the concept in business ethics can 
be traced back to a 1982 article written by Michael Davis (1982). He produced a “rough 
formulation and thorough conceptual definition with five necessary conditions that 
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characterized the conflict of interest cases”. The crucial terms were “relationship, 
judgement, interest, and proper exercise” (Norman & MacDonald, 2009, p. 5).  
 
Davis instigated further debates within academic circles which resulted in the 
production of new definitions of the conflict of interest concept. For example, John 
Boatright (1987) stressed that conflict of interest should not be explained in terms of 
judgement rather than in terms of acting in another’s interest (Boatright, 1987 in 
Carson, 1994, p. 390). 
 
However, the most frequently used and cited concept in academic literature is viewed to 
be Thomas Carson’s (1994). He was able to grasp different aspects and approached the 
problem with much vigour. Here Carson’s insights supplement Boyce and Davids’ 
(2009) work, which targeted the conflict of interest concept in the public sector. 
 
To describe this mental image following Carson, the phenomenon of conflict of interest 
should be referred to in a similar way to Boatright’s definition, rather than its broader 
‘Davisian’ version. The stress should be placed on the fact that “the conflict of interest 
should somehow hinder the individual to discharge the duties of his/her office or 
position” (Carson, 1994, p.388). Therefore, a more comprehensive description of the 
nature of conflict of interest would be: 
 
“Conflict of interest exists in any situation where an individual (I) has difficulties 
discharging the official (conventional/ fiduciary) duties attached to a position or 
office she/he holds because either: (i) there is (or believed that there is) an actual 
or potential conflict between her/his own personal interests and the interests of 
the party (P) to whom she/he owns those duties, or (ii) (I) has a desire to promote 
(or thwart) the interests of (X) and there is, (or believes that there is), an actual or 
potential conflict between promoting (or thwarting) X’s interests and interests of 
P.” (Carson, 1994, p. 388) 
 
According to Carson’s rationale, conflict of interest does not necessarily appear only in 
cases where a person fails to perform the duties of his/her position, but rather situations 
in which he/she is hindered from discharging professional duties are very common, and 
more difficult to discern (Carson, 1994, p. 390). 
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The above conceptual elaboration is classic definition found in the mainstream 
managerial tradition. The whole idea of conflict of interest is reduced to the managerial 
level. The individual is the centre of enquiry: he/she is an activator, promoter and agent 
for resolution (Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, pp. 2-3). This instrumental approach is 
mainly based on the individual’s inner characteristic features. However, there are other 
approaches to the concept as well, which will be presented below through an 
examination of the academic literature. 
 
1.1 Conflicts of Interest and Accountability 
 
To take the conflict of interest concept into the public sector, the importance of Boyce 
and Davids’ (2009) definition based on the concept of accountability brings needed 
scope into Carson’s initial account. “At the heart of many conflict of interest problems 
are issues of accountability – recognized to be the core public sector ethical 
value”(Boyce & Davids, 2009, p. 603). The basic idea is viewed as “a relationship in 
which people are required to explain and take responsibility for their actions” (Boyce & 
Davids, 2009, p. 603). Often the concept of ‘accountability’ is interchangeably used 
with its synonymous counterpart of ‘responsibility’. To define the meanings of these 
two concepts, the classic exchange between Carl Friedrich (1940) and Herman Finer 
(1941) concerning ‘the different senses of responsibility’ will be of use. Friedrich 
focused on the ‘inward’ responsibility of public servants to their professional standards 
and values, while Finer advocated the ‘external’ character responsibility in terms of 
political direction. He highlighted the concept’s ‘external’ sense with the help of 
another concept known as ‘accountability’. However, later “this debate was described as 
an argument over the relative merit of different types of ‘accountability’, external or 
internal” (Friedrich, 1940, Finer, 1941 in Mulgan, 2000, p. 557). Nevertheless, despite 
the different approaches to the concepts of ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’, the 
demarcating line is one that views ‘responsibility’ as the “ethical terrain of personal 
liability, freedom of action and discretion that are more ‘internal’ aspects of official 
activity, whereas the concept of ‘accountability’ is ‘concerned with ‘external’ functions 
and scrutiny, such as calling into account, requiring justifications and imposing 
sanctions” (Mulgan, 2000, p.556).  
! 9!
 
Based on this classic definition of the external/internal dichotomy further studies 
proliferated. The concept of ‘accountability’ was approached in its own manner, non-the 
less, retaining internal/external definition. For example, the typology of ‘accountability 
systems’ by Romzek and Dubnik (1987) describe professional, personal and subjective 
accountability. For the purpose of this work, the norm of management of expectations 
by public servants is brought to the fore. This forms part of professional accountability 
and has relevance to the case of conflict of interest. Thus, according to the authors, 
“management of expectations by public servants denote that these expectations are 
generated both internally and externally, but even when the source of accountability of 
expectations is internal, it is internal to the organisation not to the individual” (Romzek 
& Dubnik, 1987, p. 228). 
 
Another notion of accountability known as ‘social accountability’ (Boyce & Davids, 
2009, p. 604) comprises multiple dimensions, and is closely intertwined with 
answerability and responsibility. This means that “any public official who possesses 
and exercises legal power and authority must be accountable to the community for the 
exercise of that power. However, social accountability centres on bottom-up social 
rather than top-down organisational perspective on it” (Boyce & Davids, 2009, p. 604). 
 
“Social accountability in this context centres on the public ethics dimension of the 
conflict of interest, and the responsibility of the public sector has to include ex post 
answerability for past decisions and actions, as well as, built in mechanisms that 
apprehend the neglects of duties in the future”. In this connection, the way in which 
‘political optics’ (Boyce & Davids, 2009) play a significant role in terms of how things 
look to ‘reasonable members’ of the public is intrinsic here (Boyce & Davids, 2009, p. 
604).  
 
Thompson (2005) divided the concept of conflict of interest into three distinct levels 
within the society: the “micro, middle and macro levels” (Thompson, 2005, p. 274). 
According to this argument, theoretical and applied ethics centre on the use of the micro 
level concept, and neglect its importance and applicability at the middle and macro 
level. The micro-level focuses on the moral obligations and interests of individuals that 
are at the centre of typical conflict of interest situations. For the normative theory of the 
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conflict of interest, this micro-level tradition is the focus of enquiry which should be 
broadened and include the middle level theory of institutional design for different types 
of organisation, private and public. In addition, the focus should be placed on the macro 
theory for the design and regulation of markets, or global governance, within or across 
the democratic societies (Thompson, 2005, p. 274 in Norman & MacDonald, 2009, p.4).  
 
This underdeveloped middle level of theoretical and applied ethics concerns a vast range 
of institutions. It is less analysed and in need of multiple investigations concerning 
conflict of interest situations. According to Thompson, the novelty and unrecognised 
character of the conflict of interest concept is mostly indicative of its “thriving in this 
neglected realm” (Thompson, 2005, p. 274, in Norman & MacDonald, 2009, p. 4). 
 
1.2 Conflicts of Interest and Administrative Ethics 
 
The academic literature regards the conflict of interest to be a phenomenon with a short 
history as well-known concept, but with an intrinsic character that is impossible to 
disguise. According to the literature, the conflict of interest has instrumental, structural 
and psychological features. For example, as already discussed, Thomas Carlson 
accounts for typical conflict of interest cases caused by structural aspects and factors 
dependent on peculiarities of human nature (Carlson, 1994, pp. 393-395).  
 
Recent developments in the empirical research regarding conflict of interest literature 
supplements more traditional philosophical and political thinking with the works of 
psychologists and experimental engineers. The importance of good institutional design 
is paramount, according to Norman and MacDonald (2009). The combination of 
philosophers with political thinkers, psychologists and experimental economists, 
structures institutions where not only the education of personnel, but also judgement is 
effectively insulated from interests that might interfere (Norman & MacDonald, 2009, 
p. 17).  
 
Patrick Dobel views ethic policies to be mostly built on ad hoc responses to scandals 
that temper public discontent. Similar to Boyce and Davids’ (2009) argument 
concerning the importance of ‘political optics’ (Boyce & Davids 2009, p. 607), Dobel 
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sees media and ethics policies to be mutually supportive. Media coverage is interested 
in providing sensational news to the public; in doing this it drives public institutions to 
provide immediate responses instead of thoroughly elaborated, holistic policies (Dobel, 
2006, p. 16). 
 
“High integrity and ethics are accepted norms in the public administration of the 
democratic societies, and they are prerequisites for the legitimacy of the political order” 
(Dobel 2007, p. 16). In regard to this, internal management provides the public with 
accountability that creates a successful foundation. The way in which this is 
accomplished is a wider theme that is in need of much deeper investigation and 
overview, nevertheless, relying on the existent conflict of interest literature, certain 
structures can be drawn with descriptive capacity: first, there are policy agendas which 
are divided into three areas and highlight the boundaries between public institutions and 
the outside environment. This is done with the help of laws that try to discourage 
corruption or the abuse of power through the disclosure of interests, contacts and 
procedures. In the main, senior civil servants are required to disclose and recuse 
themselves from decisions, or divest investments in sensitive areas if necessary, when 
they encounter conflict of interest situations (Dobel, 2006, p. 17). 
 
Dobel argues that such disclosure procedures need further elaboration and proper 
implementation to be effective and have a reasonable outcome. The second cluster 
revolves around internal management practices where the code of ethics is the main 
instrument for enumerating the obligations and responsibilities of public managers and 
employees. The code of ethics can be considered to be effective when it supports 
already existing high ethical performance standards. The culture is based on the 
necessary education, modelling, incentives and promotion practices in support of the 
stated values (Dobel, 2006, p. 17).  
 
Unfortunately, codes are often written and promulgated in reaction to newly uncovered 
scandals, as Dobel states. Commonly, after their official introduction they are left “as 
dead letters with no strong institutional backing and enforcement” (Dobel, 2006, p. 18). 
The question of the effectiveness and usefulness of codes of ethics are often discussed: 
some authors regard their existence positively and some do not (Antechiarico & Jacobs, 
1996; Light, 1993; Kernaghan, 1993 in Dobel, 2006). On the other hand, codes recently 
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introduced by the OECD and influenced by the NPM school are viewed by Dobel to be 
expressed laconically, based on principles adaptive to the institutional particularities. 
However, the privilege of such codes of ethics lies in their advantage to “distil the 
essence of the values that liberal democracies are preaching. Together with the media, 
codes erode the distinction between private and public lives, and keep public managers’ 
private lives under increasing scrutiny” (Dobel, 2006, pp. 18-19). The final cluster 
represents oversight, scrutiny and control mechanisms from parallel agencies such as 
ombudsmen, inspectors general, and active civil society.   
 
The codes of ethics incorporated within organisations are also widely reviewed in the 
work of Heidi von Weltzien Hoivik (2002), where collectively and personally held 
professional values and values that are observed at the organisational level are 
discussed. The argument is that managers are expected to recognise and combine both 
professional and personal value systems while pursuing goals defined by the 
organisation (von Weltzien Hoivik, 2002, p. 3).  
 
In summary, the concept of conflict of interest does not have radically different 
interpretations. The literature mostly regards it to be an organisational problem centred 
on managers’ personal liabilities (Davis, 1982; Norman & McDonalds, 2009; Boatright, 
1987; Carson, 1994). However, some studies recognise this instrumental approach to be 
insufficient and point to the existence of other aspects that are in need of further 
elaboration (Romzek & Dubnik, 1987; Boyce & Davids, 2009; Thompson, 2005; 
Dobel, 2006).  
 
Developments that might have an impact on the conflict of interest concept’s particular 
character will be examined through the observation of public administrative reforms 
introduced since 1980s. But, first the main theoretical and methodological underpinning 
of the thesis will be introduced. This directs the study towards the framework needed to 
simplify the conceptual and analytical elaboration.  
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2. Critical Management Study 
 
 
The tradition of Critical Theory (CT) can be traced back to 1930s Germany, where 
thinkers such as Horkheimer, Benjamin, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas represented a 
new direction in philosophical thinking known as the Frankfurt School tradition. The 
focal point of this tradition is its counterforce to the “ego administration of modern, 
advanced, industrial society. It opposes a dominant tendency of the instrumental 
rationality that treats people as parts of well-oiled societal machine” (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2003, p. 2). 
 
In the 1990s, new streams of Critical Theory appeared, some complementing and others 
challenging the main direction of critical studies (Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, p. 3). 
The Critical Management Study (CMS) is one such branch that emerged in the UK 
(Fournier & Grey, 2000, p.10). It presents an intellectual counterpoint to the mainstream 
management studies literature, especially in its assumptions concerning forms of 
management where the manager is taken to be the main force for problem resolution. 
CMS’s strength is centred on its breadth, which accommodates various critical 
approaches on a large number of central issues in management studies (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2003, p. 2).  
 
The conflict of interest phenomenon in public administration is largely viewed to be a 
management issue. Despite the ethical aspects that constitute conflict of interest, it is 
downgraded to this managerial level. Expressions of conflict of interest are seen as 
instrumental in nature and to be dealt with technically. The analysis of the policies 
through CMS will bring the necessary scope into the theme under consideration, 
examining wider developments that may have decisive implications for better 
understanding the phenomenon (Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, pp. 2-3). 
 
As already remarked, the strength of the theory lies in its accommodation of diverse 
streams. This results in a diversity of approaches and writings, for example, noticeable 
in Habermas and Foucault’s texts. By no means should such diversity within the theory 
be taken as deficiency; instead, challenging normative ideals is the maxim on which 
critical thinking is built (Foucault, 1991b, 1978, 1980; Habermas, 1984, 1974 in 
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Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, p. 3). By being open and inclusive it provides constant 
irrigation to its intellectual currents (Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, p. 3). However, this 
theoretical diversity3 does complicate the distinction between critical and non-critical 
work on management; the boundary between them can, nevertheless, be drawn. 
Fournier and Grey highlight the distinction by focusing on three main conceptual 
norms: “performativity, denaturalisation and reflexivity” (Fournier & Grey, 2000, pp. 
16-17). 
 
The principle of performativity is one where knowledge and truth can be subordinated 
in the name of efficiency. The main stress is placed on the practices of effective 
management. Non-critical management studies commonly follow this performative path 
in designing management models. Alternatively, Critical Management Studies is non-
performative: it is concerned with the elements of knowledge, truth and efficiency, and 
performativity is of interest only when it uncovers the reality thus gained. It is helpful to 
uncover the dichotomy of critical and non-critical management studies by following the 
lexicon of concepts used. For example, “notions such as power, control and inequality is 
typically used in critical management approaches, whereas efficiency, effectiveness and 
profitability” are concepts normally used in non-critical management studies literature 
(Fournier & Grey, 2000, p. 17).  
 
Another principle that demarcates CMS from mainstream management theories is 
denaturalisation. Twentieth-century management theories predominantly constructed 
their main organisational platform through imperatives that have no alternatives (e.g. 
globalisation, competitiveness). Developments that question the ‘reality’ or 
‘truthfulness’ of organisational knowledge and life are undertaken through this principle 
of denaturalisation (Fournier & Grey, 2000, p. 18). 
 
The concept of reflexivity is the final distinction between critical and non-critical works. 
Non-critical schools of management are predominantly based on a positivistic 
philosophical and methodological reflexivity, which can be accused of being built on 
rather weak positivistic assumptions without explicit reflexion on “epistemology, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!Intellectual!traditions!invoked!by!critical!management!academics!include:!neoSMarxism,!labour!process!theory,!Frankfurt!School!of!Critical!Theory,!Gramscian!Hegemony!theory,!postSstructuralism,!deconstructionism,!feminism,!psychoanalysis,!cultural!studies,!environmentalism!(Fournier!&!Grey,!2000).!!
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ontology, and discussions of methodology”(Fournier & Grey, 2000, p. 19), rather they 
mainly rely on description of method and statistical techniques. CMS can be 
differentiated in terms of the extent of its philosophical and methodological reflexivity.  
 
Michael Reynolds stipulates that reflexivity is the key element of problem-solving in the 
process of management learning. The questioning of contextually taken-for-granted 
social, cultural and political aspects of management is the “hallmark of critical 
reflection and methodological foundation within the tradition of critical theory overall” 
(Reynolds, 1998, p. 183). 
 
Similar to Alvesson and Willmott’s (2003) argument, Reynolds contends that  
“managers as a social group exercise considerable influence. Collectively, if not 
individually, they are in a position to create or constrain employment opportunities for 
others and to help determine whether the ethos of the workplace is sustaining or 
oppressive, and they have power to foster or resist approaches to work and business 
which are in more or less harmony with the environment” (Reynolds, 1998, p. 184).  
 
In summary, CMS urges the critical examination of management, considering not only 
means-end relations, but also entrenched conditions of action and discourse. 
“Marginalised interests, silenced perspectives, corporate talk and decision making all 
are linked with the issue of power and ideology that should be taken seriously”. 
Therefore, “there are several foci for critical theory research of management to follow”: 
“resisting technicistic and objectivistic views; drawing attention to asymmetrical power 
relations and discursive closures associated with taken for granted assumptions and 
ideologies; exploring the partiality of shared and conflictual interests; and paying 
careful attention to the centrality of language and communication” (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2003, p. 16).  
 
This emphasis on communication, language and the politics of power had an impact on 
the choice of methodology for this research work. Carol Bacchi’s method of analysing 
policy using the WPR (What’s the problem represented to be?) approach accommodates 
critical management studies and its poststructural branch in analysing data discursively 
using Bacchi’s methodology. Albeit poststructuralism emerged in management studies 
partly as a challenger to the analyses guided by Critical Theory, the insights produced 
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by Michael Foucault are important supplements to critical management thought. He 
questions the idea of humanist autonomy and knowledge cleansed of power, which is 
also one of the important points adjudicated within CMS (Foucault, 1988, p. 18 in 
Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, p. 3). He is also concerned with the impact of discourses 
on the ‘subject’ which he considers to be a domain “where competing powers have 
always sought to inscribe their preferred narrations” (Foucault, 1972, p. 132, in 
Dumont, 1998, p. 222).  The main data analysed here benefits from this poststructural 
turn in terms of its methodological and theoretical purposes.  
 
 Foucault’s Influence and the WPR Methodology 
 
The WPR approach is influenced by Foucault’s ideas, especially by the stress placed on 
the concept of governmentality. Foucault uses the term in two ways: first, it denotes 
“different rationalities or mentalities of rule that influence particular approaches to 
government”, and second, the term denotes the rule focused on population that emerged 
in the late eighteenth century. ‘Governmentality’ operates on the level of population and 
utilises means such as social and economic policy to ensure security and order (Bacchi, 
2009, p. 27).  
 
Such developments had an impact on the emergence of political economy, where people 
were treated statistically as “both an object and an end of government” (Foucault, 1979, 
p. 139). Individuals became less important; rather emphasis was placed on an organic 
whole represented by people, in Foucault’s terms a ‘special body’ (Foucault, 1979, 
p.139 in Bacchi, 2009, p.27).  
 
However, Foucault did not exclude either sovereign or discipline forms of rule; rather 
he used the concept of the triangle formed by sovereignty, discipline and 
governmentality (Foucault, 1991b, p. 102 in Bacchi, 2009, p. 28). Furthermore, he 
distinguished two poles where those triangle powers intersect: biopower (biopolitics) 
(Foucault, 1991b), where society is seen as a single body, and anatomo-politics, where 
individuals and not the organic whole are the centre of interest. He considers a modern 
state to be a ‘normalising state’ that accomplishes its tasks by focusing on either 
disciplinary or societal measures (Bacchi, 2009, p. 28).  
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Government enlists professional groups to accomplish the assignment of norm 
definition. This forms standards for expectable behaviour that will give guidance for 
self-regulated individuals. Foucault sees liberalism and neoliberalism as a “form of rule 
(government rationalities) that display such character as ‘government at a distance’” 
(Foucault, 1991b in Bacchi, 2009, p. 29).  
 
These controlling tasks of government should not be understood as international 
manipulation on the part of government; instead they are forms of rule that accomplish 
the maintenance of order within the population. This does not mean that these forms of 
rules are unintentional in their character, and this should not be searched for the 
contradictions or real intentions within them. This is done by the WPR approach 
through analysing problematisations (Bacchi, 2009, p. 30).  
 
Problematisations are used in two ways: first, they search for the means by which 
issues are conceived as problems, “identifying the thinking behind particular forms of 
rule”. The second use of the term indicates interrogation: once the real issues behind the 
official wording have been defined, there is a necessity for a further elaboration of the 
problem by problematising it: in other words, interrogating. According to the WPR 
approach “every policy, by its nature, constitutes problematisations,” thus, “we are 
governed through problematisations rather than through policies” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 31).  
The approach does not deny that governments confront some real difficult conditions 
that should be addressed; however, it does not focus on the nature of those troubled 
conditions, but rather ‘on the shape of the implied problems in specific proposals. “No 
concept and category is accepted to be value-free and uncontested”(Bacchi, 2009, p. 
32). The first step is to investigate the plan of action offered in the policy proposal, 
problem representation, which is behind the formal policy statement.  
 
3. Context of the Public Sector Reforms 
 
The investigation of the problem of conflict of interest stimulates a closer look at the 
public sector domain itself. Its evolution might shed light on developments that have 
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influenced the presentation of the conflict of interest phenomenon and its elaboration by 
the organisations analysed here. 
 
Thus, the formation of the neo-liberal approach to governance in advanced capitalist 
countries around the 1980s restructured the public sector ideologically and distributed 
the same process worldwide throughout globalisation. The dominant trend in such 
reforms presupposed the application of business principles and practices, which were 
supported by the political and economic forces of advanced capitalist states. Such 
developments resulted in changes within public sector norms, objectives, structures, 
roles and service recipients, and had critical implications for public accountability 
(Hague, 2000, p. 600). 
 
During the 1980s, the main responsibilities, assignments and roles of public sector 
services were changed. Since then, their main tasks have been, “facilitating and 
supporting services to the private sector, maintenance of conducive atmosphere for 
market competition, implementation and monitoring of divestment and contracting out” 
(Hague, 2000, p. 602).  
 
Mathiasen (2007) lists six major sources for the overall change in the public sphere: the 
need for effective public management exacerbated by the globalisation of economy, 
trade and capital movements; fiscal problems encountered by nation-states; frustration 
emanating from the “size, effectiveness and cost of government”; ex-authoritarian 
countries’ need for renewed public management; the revived interest in issues of 
democratisation preached by non-governmental entities and public interest groups; 
scholarly interest in subsidiarity; and finally, the new ascendancy of the Total Quality 
Management orthodoxy as a panacea for all problems (Mathiasen, 2007, p. 7).  
 
A single significant development was the publication of the book Reinventing 
Government by Osborne and Gaebler in 1992. Advanced capitalist states showed great 
interest in applying the ideas described there in practice (Osborn & Gaebler, 1992, in 
Fox, 1996, p. 257; Kamensky, 1996).  
 
The appearance of New Public Management cannot be clearly described and 
specifically shaped: it lacks a theoretical orientation, and its ideas constantly overlap, 
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and as such it is more viewed as the combination of its predecessors (Mathiasen, 2007, 
p. 18)4. More precisely, this movement can be described as international public 
management. It is notable that these management reforms used concepts and models 
developed from beyond the boundaries of the country involved. The emergent trend 
retarded the traditional flow of public administrative affairs and resulted in a change in 
the normative standards, instead of the established public service ethos of “human 
progress, maintaining law and order, resolving poverty and employment, providing 
public welfare, impartiality and equal treatment, safeguarding citizen’s rights, 
guaranteeing justice and fairness, there were priorities that underlined economic growth 
and productivity, related to it norms of efficiency, competition and profit” (Hague, 
2000, p. 602).  
 
Such developments in the public sphere unleashed a less-anticipated effect of public 
disenchantment with civil service administrations. Public administration was blamed for 
abandoning its public law foundation, instead devoting itself to the management 
principles taught in business schools (Mathiasen, 2007; Moe & Gilmour, 1995; Aucoin, 
1994; Boyce & Davids, 2009; Caiden, 1994; Moe, 1994). The traditional hallmark of 
‘Public services’ was its relative neutrality from the power-driven political sphere and 
the profit-driven business world; however, it took just a decade to reorientate itself and 
become more supportive to political leaders and private investors (Hague, 2004, p. 1).  
Moe and Gilmour saw the problem as lying in daily practice, where the ‘grand 
synthesis’ of public administrations (Moe & Gilmour, 1995, p. 135) does not fit with 
government agencies’ programme requirements. Misled public officers find themselves 
in the situation of losing their theoretical foundation. Their intellectual tradition 
emerges from public, rather than behavioural, theories of management. These are based 
on different foundations: one is based on “judge-made common law”, and the other on 
the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights articulated by the “enormous body of 
statutory, regulatory and case laws” (Moe & Gilmour, 1995, p. 135).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!To!name!a!few!of!the!most!prominent:!Public!Service!2000!(1989)!and!the!Public!Service!Reform!Act!(1992)!in!Canada;!the!National!Performance!Review!(1993)!and!Grace!Commission!(1984)!in!the!USA;!the!Financial!Management!Initiative!(1982)!and!Next!Steps!(1998)!in!the!UK;!Renewal!of!the!Public!Service!(1989)!in!France;!Administration!Management!Project!(1998)!in!Austria;!the!Functionality!and!Effectiveness!Financial!Management!Improvement!Programme!(1984)!and!Programme!Management!and!Budgeting!(1988)!in!Australia;!the!Modernisation!Programme!for!the!Public!Sector!(2983)!and!the!Public!Sector!in!the!Year!2000!(1991)!in!Denmark;!the!State!Sector!Act!(1988)!and!Public!Financial!Act!(1989)!in!New!Zealand;!and!so!on!(Hague,!2000,!p.!600;!Hague,!2004).!!
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As a result of such innovations, fragmentation in coordination has revealed further 
problems. Today, independent agencies are places headed by entrepreneurial managers 
employed on a contractual basis rather than permanently employed public servants. 
Central coordination and control are difficult to achieve in such entities.  Furthermore, 
administrative tasks are less constrained by conventional in-built administrative norms 
such as ‘hierarchy’ and ‘public law’. The self-financing capacities of agencies make 
financial control through budgetary processes meaningless. Customer orientation, which 
logically follows the entrepreneurial trend, changes the political role of citizens into the 
economic role of consumer (Peters & Savoie, 1996, p. 283). 
 
Furthermore, the past several decades have witnessed interesting developments: the 
unexpected and unplanned evolution of economic institutions as conduits for public 
management knowledge and experience. The World Bank and the OECD are the most 
formidable actors in this group. Mathiasen (2007) argued that one explanation is the 
insufficient development of governance theories in comparison to the unequivocal 
dominance of economic trends. “Today governance has moved alongside economics 
and many of the conditions illustrative of international public management are similar 
to those applied to the developmental economics in the 1960s”. However, the author 
argues that “the economy does not have sufficient tools for rehabilitation processes that 
public management needs today” (Mathiasen, 2007, pp. 31-32). However, despite the 
economic ascendancy, the public law paradigm in public administration remains 
paramount for a class of government administrators that still have considerable 
confidence in it (Moe & Gilmour, 1995, p.142). 
 
In summary, this dominant shift has resulted in a change within the public 
administration’s normative standards. Instead of the traditional public service ethos, 
priorities have arisen that underline economic growth and productivity, and related 
norms of efficiency, competition and profit. New developments have become difficult 
to scrutinise, as the direct products and distribution of public services have been less 
tangible and controllable, and new ‘steering’ activities are less explicit and difficult to 
keep accountable (Hague, 2000, pp. 602-603). 
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All of this may have controversial consequences for public sector accountability. 
Business priorities dictate different standards that do not necessarily fit with the 
accepted norms of democratic governance. Then, doubts are expressed concerning the 
legitimacy of the new public sector norms. Interest in the nascent theme is seen in the 
headlines of media attention; announcements of misconduct and fraud are abundant and 
give additional attention to the subject of concern. The public sector’s trend towards 
looking like the private sector does not necessarily address the ethical dimension; rather, 
the headlines on the new developments are full of instrumental issues of efficiency and 
productivity (Gregory, 1999, p. 64).  
 
Foucault’s principle of government rationality (Foucault, 1991b in Bacchi, 2009, p. 27) 
partly explains the above-mentioned developments. According to him, different 
rationalities affect government approaches (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 1 in Bacchi, 2009, 
p.26). The change of government rationality transformed the old contextual design into 
a different model of public administration. The conflict of interest problem also resides 
within this newly formed domain. Its literature parallels concepts and normative 
principles found in the academic texts concerning ethical, practical and administrative 
dimensions.  
 
Possible remedies cannot be searched for separately from the wider contextual structure 
and ideological orientation. This is in line with the main insight of Critical Management 
Study that highlights the importance of investigating policy with the help of a holistic 
approach. In this particular case, conflict of interest data is observed to detect its 
compatibility with broader contextual features of public governance: does this 
ideological shift, in Foucault’s terms government rationality, play a significant role in 
the elaboration of the problem? This can be detected through the selection of common 
principles, aspirations, norms and concepts that are made central.  One such concept 
that claims particular attention is the concept of good governance. 
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 Conflicts of Interest and ‘Good Governance’ 
 
The previous section more or less summarises developments in the context of public 
administration. Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, the majority of western 
democratic countries were practising new administrative methods borrowed from 
business administration in the private sector. The success of those reforms in terms of 
the effective and efficient administration of public affairs is still debated, but it is 
noteworthy that, first, the conflict of interest phenomenon’s growing prominence and 
escalation coincided with the radical change in the main platform on which the 
traditional, classical model of public administration rested, when the fortified sense of 
the administrative ethos (Hague, 2000, p. 602), that is the honour of being protectors 
and executors of the public will and interest, became less central; second, the public 
administrative reform literature points to the unstable and dynamic context largely 
shaped by market-orientated tendencies. However, there were no parallel developments 
in public governance techniques for withstanding the newly introduced practices 
without major ethical repercussions (Hague, 2000, 2004; Mathiasen, 2007; Fox, 1996; 
Kamensky, 1996; Moe and & Gilmour, 1995; Aucoin, 1994; Boyce & Davids, 2009).  
 
Third, problems in the realm of public sector administration are often expressed through 
diverse concepts and analytical expressions. Some prominent principles demand 
attention, the concept of ‘good governance’ (Dreshler, 2004, p. 388) being one of them. 
It is recognised to be the most formidable mechanism in today’s public sector 
administration.  
 
The term ‘governance’ is a neutral concept that represents a “steering mechanism in a 
certain political unit compiled on the basis of interaction between three sectors of state 
(first), business (second) and society (third)”. On the other hand, the favoured term of 
good governance is a normative concept with a strong emphasis on “retrenchment of the 
State in favour of business standards, principles and interests.  Thus, the second sector 
dominates the first one even in such purely non-second sector affairs as the state’s 
administrative sphere capacities” (Dreshler, 2004, p. 388).  
 
In order to understand the true meaning of this popular concept, it is advised to look to 
the history of its formation. Laura Zanotti discussed the emergence of good governance 
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in connection with the “United Nations’ political rationale”. Its origination coincides 
with “the Anglo-American neoliberal critique of the interventionist welfare state”. 
Because the concept has multiple discursive connotations, she streamlined it into six 
core suggestions: “the minimal state, governance, the new public management, ‘good 
governance’, socio-cybernetic systems, and self-organising networks” (Zanotti, 2005, p. 
468). The World Bank is regarded as one of the main agitators of the good governance 
debate in the arena of international organisations in the 1990s. It is defined in terms of 
“efficiency in the public service, rule of law with regard to contracts, an effective 
judiciary sector, respect for human rights, a free press, and pluralistic institutional 
structure” (Zanotti, 2005, p. 468). The listed priorities are achieved mainly through the 
means of “marketization of public services, reduction of public sector overstaffing, 
budgetary discipline, administrative decentralisation, and NGO participation” (Zanotti, 
2005, p. 468). In short, these definitions closely follow the staple principles expressed 
in the new public management reforms.  
 
Due to the superlative characteristics that the concept of good governance undoubtedly 
possesses, the determination of ‘goodness’ cannot be applied or debated without 
confusion. Nevertheless, at the time that the IFIs (International Financial Institutions) 
were trying to make sense of this newly formed concept, in the 1980s, they were 
committed to the principles and ideological orientation of neo-liberalism, the free 
market and the retrenchment of the State (Dreshler, 2004, p. 389).  
 
Argyriades related the emergence of good governance to the period of prominent 
attacks on ‘government’ and the welfare state (Argyriades 2006, p. 157). Similar to 
Zanotti, he also regarded the World Bank to be the author of this concept (Argyriades, 
2006, p 158).   
 
“Good governance is epitomized by predictable and enlightened policy making 
(that is transparent processes): a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; 
an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil 
society participation in public affairs and all behaving under the rule of law.” 
(World Bank, 1994, p. 7)  
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This citation represents a broadly stated and well-intentioned normative description; in 
other words, a desired posture. However, the achievement of the prospective objective 
can only be accomplished through reforms that first change the normative parameters 
(Argyriades, 2006, p. 158).  
 
“The new model requires a smaller state equipped with a professional, 
accountable bureaucracy that can provide an enabling environment for private 
sector-led growth, to discharge effectively core functions, such as economic 
management, and to pursue sustained poverty reduction.” (World Bank, 1994, p. 
16) 
 
Subsequently, the administrative scene in 1990s was accompanied by ‘state shrinking’ 
in the name of economic growth vanguarded by the private sector. (Argyriades, 2006, 
pp. 158-159).  
 
These developments undoubtedly had an impact on the administrative state, which 
sought to transform itself along the lines of the market model. Conventional bureaucrats 
acquired a new shape and profile. Instead of their traditional role of administrators, from 
now on they were regarded as ‘entrepreneurial managers’ (Argyriades, 2006, p. 161).  
 
Thus, the concept of good governance is viewed as one of the main anchoring principles 
defined in the new administrative reality. This is the staple principle, frequently referred 
in the literature on public administration. Conflict of interest data will also be analysed 
for this concept’s importance. How is conflict of interest data connected to or 
influenced by the priorities expressed in the concept of good governance? Does it 
provide a certain conceptual framework within which the conflict of interest 
recommendations also evolved?  
 !!
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4.  Methodology and Data  
 
4.1  Applied Methodology   
 
Carol Bacchi’s (2009) methodology, known as the WPR (What is the Problem 
Represented) approach is a policy analysing technique. Here it supplies the Critical 
Management Study with additional tools for the execution of an effective enquiry, and 
shares with it an ability to accommodate multiple discourses. Contributions that diverse 
authors have made to the development and proliferation of critical thinking have also 
had an impact on Bacchi’s work, for example, Michael Foucault, discussed earlier in the 
theory section. 
 
The WPR approach is centred on policy-making and policy representation, which is 
understood as an elaboration of the particular policy problem. The concept of the 
problem is given special attention in Carol Bacchi’s methodology. According to the 
author, all policies by their very nature contain implicit representations. The way in 
which they are developed, discussed and presented is very important, because it shows 
“all sorts of implications for how the issue is thought about and for how the people 
involved are treated, and are evoked to think about themselves” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 1).  
 
Six key questions should be asked continuously when dealing with documents:  
 
1)“What is the ‘problem’ represented to be in a specific policy? 2) What 
presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’? 3) 
How has this representation of the ‘problem’ came about? 4) What is left 
unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the 
problem be thought differently? 5) What effects are produced by this 
representation of the ‘problem’? 6) How/ where has this representation of the 
‘problem been produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be 
questioned, disrupted and replaced?”(Bacchi, 2009, p.12)  
 
In addition, three propositions are fundamental to the work of policy analysis: 
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1) We are governed through problematisations, 2) We need to study 
problematisations (through analysing the problem representations they contain), 
rather than ‘problems’, 3) We need to problematise (interrogate) the 
problematisation on offer through scrutinizing the premises and effects of the 
problem representation they contain” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 21).  
 
The conventional distinction between state and civil society is blurred; the state is still 
viewed as one of the significant actors in the general administration of societal relations, 
along with other players. The role of experts is highlighted; such professional groups 
nowadays wield considerable power to “link individuals and organisations to objects of 
politics” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 1 in Bacchi, 2009, p. 26). The WPR approach focuses 
on experts’ knowledge-producing capacities and roles as participants in policy 
processes (Bacchi, 2009, p. 26).  
 
 
4.2 Data Description 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction, this research is based on the analysis of four 
papers, mainly written by two international organisations. These authoritative 
organisations are the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Their subsidiary organisations make feasible 
contributions to the preparation of policies; nevertheless, they are working under the 
auspices of the EU and the OECD.  
 
Two starting papers describe the main administrative context envisioned in the public 
sector of the European countries, and two others give guidance and recommendations, 
as well as the state of affairs, concerning conflict of interest problems within the same 
public governance. 
 
The ‘European Principles for Public Administration’5 (OECD, 1999) prepared by 
SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!At!its!inception!the!OECD!provided!technical!assistance!to!the!member!countries!on!purely!economic!matters.!Later!it!began!to!experiment!with!conferences!and!publications!on!aspects!of!public!management.!The!organisation’s!functions!were!formalised!under!the!new!organisational!
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Eastern European Countries) and PUMA (Public Management Service) is a joint 
venture of the OECD and the EU to support reform initiatives within countries in 
transition.  
 
This paper was produced for new and future members of the EU. The description of the 
main principles, the foundation on which EU governance rests, is explicitly drawn. 
Thus, it is a useful presentation of the fundamental norms for which the EU strives in its 
governance. The first version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Heads of 
Civil Services held in Vienna 1998. This meeting significantly contributed to the 
assessment of countries’ public sector administrative capacities and their progress in 
developing civil service practices. “Established in 1992, SIGMA works within the 
OECD’s Public Management Directorate, which provides information and expert 
analysis on public management to policy-makers and facilitates contact and exchange of 
experience amongst public sector managers. SIGMA is a joint initiative of the OECD 
and the European Union and is principally financed by the European Union’s Phare 
Programme” (OECD, 1999, p. 2). 
 
In order to understand the relevance of the document to the interest of this enquiry, the 
space devoted to laying the ground rules for officials’ expected behaviour will be 
investigated. It is of interest to note how the document elaborates principles and 
recommended practices for the infrastructure that public service organisations should 
possess first in order to be able to cope with the introduction of reforms. As already 
mentioned, the staple concepts, steering mechanisms, normative and operational 
soundness of public governance and the conflict of interest data will be compared. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!department!known!as!the!Public!Management!Service!(PUMA).!Later,!PUMA!used!its!experience!to!assist!in!the!transition!from!centrally!managed!countries!to!market!economies.!To!execute!such!a!mission,!a!subsidiary!organisation!was!created,!known!as!SIGMA!(Support!for!Improvement!in!Governance!and!Management!in!Central!and!Eastern!European!Countries).!The!public!management!project!was!reorganised!into!the!new!Public!Governance!and!Territorial!Development!Directorate!(GOV),!which!assists!countries!in!adapting!their!public!sector!governance!arrangements!to!the!changing!needs!of!society!(Salzman,!2000,!pp.!774S775);!Mathiasen,!2007,!pp.!22S24).!The!OECD!helps!to!identify!problems!and!search!for!best!practice!solutions,!this!in!turn!reflects!its!ability!to!contribute!to!larger!ideological!shifts!(Mahon!&!McBride,!2009,!p.!84).!!!
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Conflict of interest cases have moral and ethical repercussions: this logically indicates 
that the administration of public affairs should be based on the appropriate ethical 
infrastructure. What matters is the approach with which the problem encountered is 
thought to be resolved; in Foucault’s words, the “government rationalities” (Foucault, 
1991b in Bacchi, 2009, p.29). 
 
The Commission of the European Communities is the author of the second document, 
titled ‘European Governance, a White Paper’ (COM, 2001). This was prepared in July 
2001, with the purpose of being widely accessible to the public. It is easily retrieved 
from the Internet, and was disseminated in the form of brochures (COM, 2001). As 
discussed above, the concept of governance is the domain where conflict of interest 
resides and finds its worst expressions. Observing the EU’s 2000 initiative to reform 
European governance will reveal key developments related to the main theme of 
interest.  
 
‘Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Service’ (OECD, 2003), written by the 
OECD, is the third document analysed here. It was the first international benchmark and 
official report concerning the problem of conflict of interest. “It was developed in 
collaboration with the Expert group on conflict of interest, under the chairmanship of 
Howard R. Wilson, Ethics counsellor of the government of Canada, and under the 
direction of the OECD Public Management Committee. The OECD Council endorsed 
the Guidelines in the form of Council’s recommendations in June 2003” (OECD, 2003, 
p. 3). Close observation of the organisation is made in order to better understand the 
recommendations of the policy guidelines. It is important to be aware of the initial 
reason for its creation, which was purely economic (Salzman, 2000, pp. 774-775).  
 
In 2006, the European Commission delegated responsibility for making a comparative 
study of administration. The European Institute for Public Administration in 
cooperation with University of Helsinki, the University of Vaasa and the Utrecht school 
of Governance proceeded with this comparative study, later named ‘Regulating 
Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ (Salminen et 
al., 2007, p. 15). It can be regarded as “the pioneering work in the field of conflict of 
interest in Europe” due to its comparative and inter-institutional approach (Salminen et 
al., 2007, p.17). This study investigates in detail the state of affairs of the conflict of 
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interest phenomenon. It addresses the nascent problem of regulating conflict of interest 
for holders of public office (HPO) in the European Union and analyses the existing 
rules and standards for HPO regarding the conflict of interest issue among EU member 
states and institutions. More precisely, it focuses on the observation and comparison of 
the various rules and standards contained in the laws, regulations and codes of conduct 
for members of government, elected members of parliament (legislators), Judges of the 
Court of Justice (Supreme Courts or Constitutional Courts), and members or directors 
of the Court of Audit and Central or National Banks (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 13). 
 
These two conflict of interest papers are viewed in connection to the broader EU 
principles. An attempt is made to detect the conflict of interest discourses that 
organisations promulgate and check their correlation with the developments in public 
governance. Do modern tendencies within European public governance influence 
models suggested by the conflict of interest data? Subsequently, a more or less clear 
picture can be drawn that will hopefully answer the main research question: How is the 
problem of conflict of interest represented by the OECD and EU? And how 
consistent are they with the broader EU administrative framework?  
 
All of these papers were written in the period from the end of the 1990s until 2010, 
instigated by the growth of moral scandals and ethical downturns. The focus is placed 
on those assumptions that attempt to fill the holes formed by improper conduct; 
solutions provided to resolve problems; compatibility of the data with the main platform 
of European governance; techniques and mechanisms described for dealing with 
conflict of interest cases; core principles that coincide, or do not coincide with the 
government rationality (Foucault, 1991b in Bacchi, 2009, p. 29) legalised within the 
normative framework of European public governance.  
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5.  Analysis  
 
5.1 Problem Statement 
 
Critical Management Theory (CMT) warns against “counteractive discursive closures” 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, p. 17); in other words, clear and objective statements. 
Questioning and uncovering what has come to be seen as a given, unproblematic and 
natural in WPR is done by focusing not on the generally stated problem but rather on its 
implicit representation.  
 
The first staple question of Bacchi’s methodology, what is the problem represented to 
be in a specific policy? (Bacchi, 2009, p. 79) opens the analysis.  
The problems explicitly stated in the first two documents are linked mostly to the 
structural aspects of public administration. For example, the ‘European Principles for 
Public Administration’ paper mainly focuses on the development of the common 
European system based on administrative forms that are deeply convergent with each 
other. Modern forms of administration are so intertwined and interconnected that their 
effective working dictates convergence between the national administrative legal orders 
and administrative practices of Member States (OECD, 1999, p. 6). Therefore, the 
European Administrative Space (EAS) is the metaphor invoked for accomplishing this 
end. In brief, the problem that the policy tries to deal with is that of institutional 
fragmentation among the Member States.  
 
 ‘European Governance, A White Paper’ defines the explicit problem as peoples’ 
increasing distrust of European institutions and politics. Stating this, the document 
presents a plan of action, which presupposes a reform initiative to accomplish the goal 
of connecting Europe with its citizens (COM, 2003, p.3). The proposals for change 
unleash technical and structural issues that affect power politics, interest 
representations, and redistribution of the balance of power. The implicit problem 
representation is recognized to be a lack of concerted and efficient governance within 
the EU.  
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The problems described above by the European governance papers (1999; 2001) were 
prominent more or less at the same period as the conflict of interest papers were 
published (2003, 2007). The statements presented below are the conflict of interest 
data’s recognition of the explicit and implicit problem representation (Bacchi, 2009) in 
their texts.  
 
The ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service’ guideline defines the main 
challenge as a loss of integrity and trust in government agencies in todays’ public 
administration (OECD, 2003, p. 11). Such a clearly stated representation of the problem 
nevertheless directs attention to the proposed resolution that the guideline recommends. 
These recommendations draw a slightly different picture, which is the attempt to 
retain the status quo in public administration despite growing evidence of conflict 
of interest cases. 
 
 ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ 
sees the problem to be the ineffectiveness of modern conflict of interest models to 
remedy the situation at stake due to the constant drop in the public’s trust in 
government integrity and administration of public affairs in particular (Salminen 
et al., 2007, p. 14). 
 
Thus, the loss of integrity and trust in government agencies, which is clearly sounded in 
at least three papers out of the four (in ‘European Governance, A White Paper’ (2001) 
this is more implied than concretely stated, stipulating more structural aspects than 
lamenting the public’s mood), shows disillusionment in state agencies due to an 
inability to organise effectively, and point to overall systemic problems.  
 
Before proceeding to the second of Bacchi’s (2009) questions, space is devoted to a 
closer elaboration of Europe’s administrative platform. For this reason, the first two 
data papers are examined (‘European Principles for Public Administration’ and ‘ 
European Governance, A White Paper’). The information gained can be useful 
supporting material for unveiling the broader administrative rationale (Foucault, 1991b 
in Bacchi, 2009, p.29), due to the congruent themes and principles common to the 
conflict of interest data and the data representing the European administrative context. 
Some findings might be useful descriptive tools and others ignored as irrelevant to the 
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conflict of interest data analysed here. The idea of reflexivity (Reynolds, 1998, p. 183) 
that Critical Management Study adjudicates questions the contextually taken-for-
granted assumptions, therefore a closer look at the main principles and developments 
found within European public administration is the next task to perform. 
 
5.2 Contextual Features 
 
The first two papers’ contextual characteristics describe administrative change on the 
basis of several key principles. Examining these issues, a certain picture can be formed 
of the main currents that European governance make central. These issues are subsumed 
under the category of structural change, which consists of principles of Convergence 
/coherence, balance of power, decentralisation, and managerialism (OECD, 1999; 
COM, 2001).  
 
The pivotal concept of good governance discussed in the above section also finds its 
expression in both papers on European governance. However, it is not made central, but 
rather mentioned in connection to the EU’s acceptance and appreciation of its 
authoritative character. For example, ‘European Principles for Public Administration’ 
sees the achievement of good governance’s main priorities through the process of 
standardisation. The principle of good governance is equated with the acquis 
communautaire principle that EU Member States implement. Candidate countries are 
advised to follow general standards of good governance in order to meet the 
administrative priorities defined within the EU (OECD, 1999, p. 6). 
 
‘European Governance, A White Paper’ refers to the good governance principle in 
connection with the debate on global governance: “The Union should seek to apply the 
principles of good governance to its global responsibilities. It should aim to boost the 
effectiveness and enforcement power of international institutions” (COM, 2001, p. 5).  
 
A relatively clear understanding exists of the idea behind the good governance due to 
the earlier elaboration of the concept. Hence, these priorities are acknowledged and 
appreciated by the wider EU administrative framework. However, it is not central in the 
data’s discourses, and for this reason, will not be included in the group addressed here. 
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However, there should be an acknowledgement that good governance is a meta-concept 
within European public administration from which other principles and priorities 
proliferate.   
 
The concept of convergence is important in the European setting. Both documents on 
European governance see the necessity for synergy or coherence among their 
institutions, legal systems, operations and structures as one of the key points for the 
efficient and effective functioning of the EU. Actually, both documents see the main 
deficiency of the Union as lying in its unwieldy and complicated nature. Therefore, this 
process of synergy is presented as a safeguard for reliable administrative principles and 
procedures (OECD, 1999, p. 6; COM, 2001, p. 10). 
 
‘European Governance, A White Paper’ sees that simplicity can be achieved in 
operations through the principle of coherence. It argues: 
 
“Policies and action must be coherent and easily understood. The need for 
coherence in the Union is increasing … coherence requires political leadership 
and a strong responsibility on the part of the institutions to ensure a consistent 
approach within a complex system” (COM, 2001, p. 10)   
 
 ‘European Principles for Public Administration’ elaborates this aspect of convergence 
as indicator against which the reliability of the public administration and the degree of 
accountability of civil servants and public authorities is checked (OECD, 1999, p. 19). 
On the basis of this assumption, synergy in the operations of EU governance 
presupposes policy models that will be easily transferable and applicable across 
countries and institutions. Therefore, the problem of ethical administration, where the 
principles of the reliability and accountability of civil servants play an important part, is 
a deficiency to be transformed through the introduction of convergence models in civil 
service operations. 
 
“The European Administrative Space (EAS) represents an evolving process of 
increasing convergence between national administrative legal orders and 
administrative practices of Member States. This convergence is influenced by 
several driving forces, such as economic pressures from individuals and firms, 
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regular and continuous contacts between public officials of Member States and, 
finally and especially, the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice.” 
(OECD, 1999, p. 6) 
 
“Co-operation and change have the effect of creating informal peer pressure for 
setting shared standards for the way in which national public administration meet 
their supranational commitments and of ensuring the attainment of the policy 
results … These intergovernmental cooperation contribute to spreading and 
sharing a shared ideal role model for the behaviour of civil servants throughout 
the Union.” (OECD, 1999, p. 17) 
 
While ‘European Governance, A White paper’ addresses the change through power 
redistribution between institutional operations and functions, mainly through 
empowering the Commission (COM, 2001, pp. 30-32), 
 
“The Commission brings forward at the next intergovernmental Conference 
proposals to refocus executive responsibility on the Commission while 
streamlining the control by Council and the European Parliament over how the 
Commission uses its executive powers.” (COM, 2001, p. 32) 
 
The reform outlined in  ‘European Principles for Public Administration is less focused 
on the aspect of power redistribution. The impetus for change comes from the 
reorganisation of the role of administrators for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness. 
For example, the paper introduces the main administrative law principles that shape the 
European administrative space through fundamental norms for acceptable behaviour on 
the part of public administrators. These are the principles of reliability and 
predictability (legal certainty); openness and transparency; accountability; and 
efficiency/effectiveness. Issues of employment, mobility, discretion and rule-following 
are important (OECD, 1999, pp. 8-13): 
 
“The recognition of efficiency as an important value for public administration 
and civil service is relatively recent. Insofar as the State has become the producer 
of public services, the notion of productivity has entered the public 
administration. Today, because of fiscal constraints in many States, the efficient 
and effective performance of public administration in delivering public services 
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to the society is increasingly studied. Efficiency is characteristically a managerial 
value consisting in essence of maintaining a good ration between resources 
employed and results attained.” (OECD, 1999, p. 13) 
 
The change of the balance of power is demonstrated in ‘European Governance, A White 
Paper’ through‘ institutional refocusing’. As already mentioned, the Commission has 
acquired increased executive responsibility; at the same time, the role of experts has 
grown as a source of professional advice employed through specially created regulatory 
agencies (COM, 2001, pp. 22-24). 
 
 “The Commission will:  - use its right initiative to focus more strongly on policy 
coherence and identifying long-term objectives, building upon on-going efforts 
for strategic planning and reporting.” (COM, 2001, p. 32) 
 
The concept of decentralisation also plays an important part in power redistribution. It 
is central to the change envisaged in ‘European Governance, A White Paper’s’. It sees 
this process to be one of the key elements. The dialogue with representatives of regional 
and local governments takes on a systematic character and guarantees the fulfilment of 
the principles of ‘subsidiarity and proportionality’ (execution of the policy on the 
appropriate level, and proportionate to the end result pursued by the policy); this should 
be accomplished through more flexibility in implementation, minimisation of standards 
for consultation on EU policy, and through partnership arrangements (COM, 2001, p. 
1).  ‘European Principles for Public Administration’ is rather concerned with the 
democratic aspects of its functions. The reestablishment of the link between people and 
the EU is accomplished through civil service acts of standard behaviour on the part of 
public administrators rather than through the participation of devolved bodies in 
decision-making (OECD, 1999, p. 22). The struggle for power and influence between 
institutional settings is less envisaged. However, some redistribution of priorities and 
obligations is advised; for example, the reorganisation of civil administration. The 
document argues in support of the creation of professional administration. This newly 
created body, in line with the popular practices of managerialism, devolves all 
responsibilities to the public administrators; in other words, managers, in the modern 
sense of the word (OECD, 1999, pp. 24-25). Does redistribution of power and influence 
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guarantee more independence and autonomy to those individuals? This issue brings the 
next category under scrutiny.  
 
“Improving the performance of the public administration means seeking better 
standards of efficiency and effectiveness within the rule of law. This usually 
requires delegation and devolution of responsibilities in favour of public 
managers, accompanied by ex ante and ex post control mechanism. In such a 
situation, the quality of public managers, vested with these public powers, 
becomes of the utmost importance. Moreover, when national policy-making 
becomes more and more complex and more and more exposed to international 
co-ordination, as it is the case in all EU Member States, the need for top public 
managers, with broad perspectives and ability to co-ordinate their work with both 
national and international institutions becomes even more apparent” (OECD, 
1999, p. 24)  
 
 ‘European Principles for Public Administration’ (OECD, 1999) pays special attention 
to the exercise of managerial power. It sees the reformation of the public governance 
system in this modern direction. However, it is wrong to use the category of 
managerialism here in its classic sense (the reason will be explained below). Here it is 
used in exaggerated form only so as to parallel the principle of managerialism with its 
softer version.  
 
The regulation of the civil services, according to ‘European Principles for Public 
Administration’, is a necessary task for relieving pressure. It sees the enactment of 
specific civil service regulations to be important for consolidating the core 
administrative principles. Professional public management should be based on the 
highest official position in government, which resembles senior officials traditionally 
found in France with its career system of the corps (OECD, 1999, p. 21). The 
advancement of the common professional public managers “entails actions in several 
domains: training managers, introducing regulations, defining duties, accountabilities, 
and corresponding rights of staff, as in the civil service specific regulation, improving 
personnel management and management standards, and above all, establishing 
administrative context in which officials and public managers can carry out their duties 
in professional, impartial, transparent and controllable way” (OECD, 1999, p. 25).  
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“Modern, constitutional civil service in democracy is regarded as possible only 
when a set of conditions are in place: 
 
• Separation between a public sphere and a private sphere. 
• Separation between politics and administration. 
• Development of individual accountability of civil servants by overcoming 
former collegial decision-making processes. This calls for well-educated and 
skilful public managers. 
• Sufficient job protection, stability, and level of pay, and clearly defined rights 
and duties of civil servants. 
• Recruitment and promotion based on merit.” (OECD, 1999, p. 21) 
 
This is a good example of the attempt to strike a balance between the modern 
administrative reality, which has changed since the days of classic bureaucracy, on the 
one hand, and the attempt to preserve key, fundamental principles of administrative law 
and basic legal conditions, such as merit, equal rights and duties, on the other hand 
(OECD, 1999, p. 26). Despite the attempt to supplement traditional public 
administration with the modern tools of management, the proposed model still retains 
some fundamental principles prominent in classical forms of bureaucracy.  
 
In summary, based on the data analysed here, the European context for public 
governance is characterised by fragmentation. The environment of public administration 
is dynamic. The need for coordinated action between the administrative institutions of 
Member States is unavoidable in order to withstand pressures exerted by the economy, 
inter-institutional contacts, the mobility of public administrators, inter-sectoral overlaps, 
public-private partnerships, contract-based employment, etc. An interesting 
development is seen in the OECD’s ‘European Principles for Public Administration’, 
where the creation of a professional body of public managers is based on contradictory 
principles and practices addressed below in detail. Therefore each document sees that 
synergy should be achieved through different means, albeit the objective of restoring the 
public’s trust and integrity in civil service administration is shared.   
 
How can this description be of help or connect with the conflict of interest problem? 
First, it is more or less clear now what problems were upsetting the domain of European 
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governance at the time when the conflict of interest data was created: 1) the unwieldy 
and over-complicated nature of the administration that both papers seek to remedy 
through the process of convergence and coherence; 2) structural and functional 
modification sought by the European governance through the change of the balance of 
power and the extensive decentralisation; and 3) new principles and tendencies 
borrowed from mainstream management schools such as managerialism, that should be 
properly incorporated within existent civil services.  
 
Second, some developments presented above are less correlated with the conflict of 
interest issue but nevertheless give a basic picture of the environment within which the 
problem of conflict of interest also resides (for example, the redistribution of balance of 
power and decentralisation presented by ‘European Governance, A White Paper’ 
(COM, 2001). Third, some of these are closely related to the conflict of interest data. 
Convergence/coherence and managerialism will be equated with the conflict of interest 
papers’ analysis. The WPR methodology’s staple questions bring to the fore the 
presuppositions and assumptions behind the stated problem representations. The 
findings will be compared with the principles selected from the European contextual 
data presented above of convergence/ coherence and managerialism. The conflict of 
interest data is divided into the themes that render special attention: public /private 
partnership, individualism, overregulation, and Roman law vs. Common law countries.  
 
5.3 The Conflict of Interest Data and Problem Representation 
 
So, the conflict of interest phenomenon resides within the fragmented institutional 
setting where institutional fragmentation and lack of concerted and efficient governance 
(OECD, 1999; COM, 2001) are the main characteristic problems. An attempt is made to 
introduce changes in order to accommodate new developments.  
 
The next focus is on the data that deal directly with the issue of conflict of interest. 
They are examined and checked for correlation with the above recounted contextual 
features of European governance. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie the 
policies representation of the problem there? (Bacchi, 2009, p. 81). 
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First, the problem representation in the conflict of interest guidelines (‘Managing 
Conflict of Interest in the Public Service’ (OECD, 2003)), which is explicitly stated as 
loss of integrity and trust in government agencies in todays’ public administration 
(OECD, 2003, p. 11), also find expression in ‘European Principles for Public 
Administration’.  
 
“Professional integrity of civil service relies upon the notions of impartiality and 
professional independence. Impartiality refers to the absence of bias. Within the 
public administration domain, bias means having an inclination in favour of a 
particular outcome in assessing a given situation, causing as a consequence an 
unjustified or unfair detriment to the general interest or to the right of other 
interested parties.” (OECD, 1999, p. 11).  
 
Such ethical issues are dealt through structural change targeted towards the obliteration 
of institutional fragmentation in the name of concerted and efficient governance. The 
main mechanism for this is the introduction of convergent and coherent models to 
resolve the problem of integrity (OECD, 1999; COM, 2001).  
 
 ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service’ (OECD, 2003) supports the 
European governance’s strive for coherence through convergence models. It “provides a 
comprehensive reference for public institutions seeking to ensure probity in public 
decision-making” (OECD, 2003, p. 23).  
 
“The desirability of establishing a set of core principles, policy frameworks and 
institutional strategies for managing conflict-of interest matters in the public 
service.” (OECD, 2003, p. 14) 
 
In opposition to EU’s aspiration towards standardisation and convergence,  ‘Regulating 
Conflicts of Interests for Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ states that 
there cannot be a “patent recipe” for all institutions and countries to incorporate. Their 
diversity suggests the use of a “careful design and implementation of ethic regimes that 
is most appropriate to each institution” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 10). 
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This statement actually disqualifies all ready-made policy models, and encourages an 
individual approach to problem resolution. This argument is totally in line with the 
fundamental orientation of Critical Management Study, which dismisses the 
prototypical application of policies and management styles across different 
administrative entities. However, it is in disagreement with the principles and 
aspirations that were examined above in the papers addressing the main European 
priorities. The convergence that the EU strives to achieve between its Member States 
and different institutions is the foundation on which the whole idea of unionisation 
rests. The unwieldy and ineffective forms of administration, which fragment 
collaboration and widen the gap between EU institutions, Member States, and citizens 
are developments that the EU strives to reverse. This nevertheless raises doubts about 
the applicability of such approaches, at least in relation to the conflict of interest 
problem.  
 
Although ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service’ (OECD, 2003) admits 
the application of standard models for the conflict of interest policy, the compatibility of 
such a model with its own recommendations is examined below. For example, there is 
encouragement to introduce “standards for policy design and implementation that will 
encourage partnership between the public sector and the business and non-profit sectors 
by suggesting the responsibilities of each for improving integrity and strengthening the 
business environment” (OECD, 2003, p. 11). However, incorporation of business and 
non-profit sectors within the workings of public sector institutions is difficult to 
systematise into the standards for policy design and implementation.  
 
An attempt is made to adjust different spheres of public administration and economic 
interests to produce efficient partnerships despite the acknowledged difficulties of 
ethical character that are produced as a result of such encounters. 
 
“New forms of relationships have developed between public sector, business and 
non-profit sector, giving rise for example to increasing close forms of 
collaboration such as public/private partnerships, self regulation, interchanges of 
personnel, and sponsorships. New forms of employment in the public sector have 
also emerged with potential for changes of traditional employment obligations 
and loyalties. In consequence, there is clearly emerging potential for new forms 
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of conflicts of interest involving individual official’s private interests and public 
duties and growing concern has put pressure on governments to ensure that the 
integrity of official decisions-making is not compromised.” (OECD, 2003, p. 22)  
 
Several themes selected from the conflict of interest data need to be addressed 
separately. Their elaboration may better explain the character of the conflict of interest 
recommendations and their applicability within the contextual environment of European 
public governance.  
 
5.4 Emerging Themes 
 
The WPR methodology advises to centre on key presuppositions, or concepts, that the 
policies contain. Those may be explicit statements, as well as, implicit assumptions 
(Bacchi, 2009, p. 8). In both cases, these main themes are important ingredients in 
creation of desired policy.  Here, those prominent themes are defined and compared 
with the contextual analysis’s main principles.  
 
5.4.1 Public-Private Partnership 
 
The principles of public–private partnership, which is in the group of main prerogatives 
defined by the ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service’ guideline (OECD, 
2003), are counterpoised to the standards of European public administration (OECD, 
1999).   
 
A contextual space offered by the ‘European Principles for Public Administration’ 
necessitates: 1) separation between a public and a private sphere; 2) separation 
between politics and administration; 3) sufficient job protection, stability, and level of 
pay, and clearly defined rights and duties of civil servants; 4) Recruitment and 
promotion based on merit; 5) stressing individual accountability of civil servants by 
overcoming former collegial decision-making (OECD, 1999, p. 21). All except the last 
principle are difficult to reconcile with the OECD’s conflict of interest guideline 
(OECD, 2003). Its adjustment within the public governance based on ‘European 
Principles for Public Administration’ is questionable. According to this document, the 
European administrative space of a modern constitutional civil service in a democracy 
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should be safeguarded from excessive manifestations of managerialism (OECD, 1999, 
p. 21), but at the same time, there is an admixture of norms based on the rational-actor 
model that are less compatible with the fundamental principles pursued by the same 
paper (OECD, 1999).   
 
Salminen and his colleagues (‘Regulating Conflict of Interest for Holders of Public 
Office in the European Union’) mostly regard this issue in connection to post-
employment cases (due to the later period of their study’s publication in 2007), since by 
then public-private intersections had become more widespread and common.  
 
“New forms of relationship have developed between the public and private sector 
and give rise to increasingly close forms of collaboration between the two 
sectors.” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 32) 
 
Their main argument concerning the issue is based on the comparison made between 
Member States and European institutions. They detect that the regulation of post-
employment issues is handled insufficiently, mostly being approached formally without 
built-in mechanisms of oversight, control and supervision. The disclosure procedures 
found in most Member States’ administration and institutions are predominantly 
internal and less transparent to public scrutiny (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 11).  
 
“New forms of mobility between the public and private sectors may provoke 
more potential conflicts of interest as regards post-employment issues.” 
(Salminen et al., 2007, p. 32) 
 
“As to the specific conflict of interest issues, some categories are highly 
regulated, whereas others are not. The category of post-employment is the least 
regulated conflict of interest area among the Member States.” (Salminen et al., 
2007, p. 11). 
 
Changing practices and expectations, for example, in areas such as additional 
employment, outside appointment, post-public employment, use of inside information, 
public contracts, new forms of gifts and other benefits are presented as widespread 
developments that are generalised in today’s public sector environment (OECD, 2003, 
p. 18).  
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Despite the acknowledged risks that the partnerships of such kind presuppose, 
‘Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Service’ (OECD, 2003) develops no 
detailed elaboration of this issue. Post-employment should be examined with attention 
and care, as it is the most fertile ground on which conflict of interest cases manifest. 
However, according to the OECD guideline, there is sufficient foundation on which 
such relationships can exist. The mechanisms incorporated for control and supervision 
guard against conflict of interest (OECD, 2003, p. 35). There is no detailed elaboration 
of those mechanisms, but the definition of the circumstances under which public 
officials may engage in ancillary employment while retaining their official position is 
suggested. There are also authorisation procedures under which public officials 
undertake post-employment appointments which are involved in a contractual, 
regulatory, partnership or sponsorship arrangement with their employer organisation 
(OECD, 2003, p. 33).  
 
However, the details of these procedures and control mechanisms, and how they should 
be effectively incorporated are less concretely explained, apart from the suggestion that 
control and supervision be mainly entrusted to individual managers as the key 
remedying force in keeping the public administration accountable. Disclosure 
procedures should also be handled internally, and in the cases of noncompliance, 
management and internal controls, as well as external oversight institutions – such as 
independent auditors or an ombudsman – should work together to detect those who do 
not comply with required standards (OECD, 2003, pp. 35-36). The problem of 
public/private partnerships is handled by its own means. In other words, the business 
and non-profit sectors are involved in the elaboration and implementation of the conflict 
of interest policy for public officials: 
 
“Mechanisms for resolving conflict-of-interest situations must be kept up-to-date 
in the context of increasing co-operation between public organisations and the 
business and non-profit sectors. This is particularly crucial when appointing 
representatives to public bodies from other sectors to benefit from their particular 
experience, knowledge and involvement. Create partnerships for integrity with 
the business and non-profit sectors by involving them in the elaboration and 
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implementation of the conflict-of-interest policy for public officials.” (OECD, 
2003, p. 36).  
 
 ‘European Principles for Public Administration’ in this regard is based on a rather 
different idea, and the principle of public/private partnership is not supported. At least 
three of the five principles it discusses present administrative domains that are 
incompatible with the conflict of interest guideline.   
 
The emphasis placed on individual managers’ ability to functionally resolve problems 
resulting from public/private partnerships brings the next category under scrutiny: the 
concept of individualism. 
 
5.4.2 Individualism 
 
The most prominent category in ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service’ 
guideline is a ‘public manager’ who is individually responsible for the conflict of 
interest policies’ implementation and monitoring. They are obliged to be aware that 
polices are updated, observed by all, and consistent with the continuously evolving 
situation (OECD, 2003, p. 18).  
 
The principle of individualism is also tangible in ‘European Principles for Public 
Administration’, and absent from ‘European Governance, A White Paper’, where the 
main problem representation centres on structural aspects of governance with 
institutional and functional refocusing. Despite ‘European Principles for Public 
Administration’s tendency to be conservative in its approach concerning the main 
priorities on which the European civil service should rest, widespread administrative 
developments, in the form of reforms, have had their logical influence on it. For 
example, “individual accountability of civil servants by overcoming former collegial 
decision-making” is one of the five staple principles of European governance (OECD, 
1999, p. 21). The civil service model strives for a public administration based on 
standards of efficiency and effectiveness within the rule of law. ‘This is achieved by 
delegation and devolution of responsibilities in favour of public managers” (OECD, 
1999, p. 24). The professionalisation of civil servants, nevertheless, is based on 
priorities that call for some kind of central capacity-building for the management of 
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civil services. This in turn is a common management function within public 
administration (OECD, 1999, pp. 25-26), rather than the individual endeavour stipulated 
in the ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service’ guideline (OECD, 2003).  
 
The conflict of interest guideline underlines the idea that organisational culture and its 
preservation is also the public manager’s responsibility. They should uphold an 
‘organisational culture’ that is based on ‘an open management culture’. This is one in 
which employees and their managers meet from time to time, and discuss conflicts of 
interest matters: employees disclose conflicting interest, and analyse it, then together 
with their supervisors make a final decision concerning these matters (OECD, 2003, 
p.18). 
 
The emphasis is on the individual characteristics of a reasonable person to decide on 
such morally weighted questions as that of whether the organisation’s integrity is at risk 
from unresolved conflict of interest cases, and which prerogative should be chosen 
when the interests of employees, organisations, businesses and the public clash (OECD, 
2003, pp. 29-37); this is not an exception but rather a standard condition inherent in the 
management of administrative affairs.  
 
That such a tremendous burden would totally rely on the individual raises the question 
of ability. Researchers in the field of cognitive and motivational biases have found 
fertile ground for the application of their work in the study of conflict of interest. Based 
on empirical and theoretical knowledge concerning human judgement, the answer has 
been produced that “if consistent and persistent biases are found at the level of an 
individual, it seems unlikely that effective solutions are going to be found through the 
self-reflective practices of those consistently and persistently biased individuals” 
(Norman & MacDonald, 2009, p. 18), which is in disagreement with the mainstream 
conflict of interest literature (addressed at the beginning of this work).  The ‘Managing 
Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector’ (OECD, 2003) policy guideline also underpins 
this Davisian/Carlsonian (Davis, 1982; Carlson, 1994) stress on the personal 
responsibilities of civil servants in relation to the conflict of interest problem. The focus 
is on humans’ cognitive capabilities of recognition, anticipation and disclosure that 
enable them to deal with ethical problems if they are trained and previously familiarised 
with the relevant principles.   
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Kahneman and Tversky described their views of heuristic and biases as follows: “In 
making predictions and judgements under uncertainty, people do not appear to follow 
calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction. Instead, they rely on a limited 
number of heuristics, which sometimes yield reasonable judgements and sometimes 
lead to severe and systematic errors” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, p. 237; Shanteau, 
1989, p. 166).  
 
Alternatively, the reliance of ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interests for Holders of Public 
Office in the European Union’ (Salminen et al., 2007) on personal capabilities in 
relation to the conflict of interest issues is reduced to a minimum. Nowhere is the inner 
ethical predisposition of individuals considered as a viable standard to be followed. The 
document recognises the necessity for the conflict of interest regulations and codes of 
conduct to be formalised and legally defined in organisational statutes and laws; 
however, management on the basis of rule following and the routine compilation of 
principles is regarded to be insufficient. With the passage of time and emergence of new 
public administrative realities, as a result of decades of experience with the new forms 
of administration, the domain of public officials has become ever more complicated, 
infused with additional problems that aggravate an already difficult situation (Salminen 
et al., 2007, p. 14). 
 
 ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ 
may be seen as a counterweight to its predecessor, the OECD guideline (2003). It sees 
public registers and independent ethic committees as one possible remedy for resolving 
the conflict of interest challenge. The focus of such bodies should be on their reporting 
capacities being easily accessible to the public (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 7).  
 
The instrumental measures recommended by the OECD guideline (OECD, 2003) are 
under–questioned in this policy. Their widespread use is suspected to be often 
ineffective and sometimes impractical (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 7-8). Rules and 
standards should be appropriately managed and with their application, the issues of 
implementation and enforcement should be closely surveyed. In real life they are 
usually left neglected. The means of implementation, control and monitoring is left 
without sufficient attention; therefore the situation is far from being changed (Salminen 
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et al., 2007, p. 8). Despite the debate in the OECD guideline concerning prosecutions 
and sanctions in cases of non-compliance, ‘Regulating Conflicts of interest for Holders 
of Public Office in the European Union’ presents self-regulation of ethics as being the 
least advisable. The famous maxim that “no one should be the judge in his own cause” 
is the “foundation on which fundamental values of due process, limited government, 
separation of powers and judicial review rest” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 85).   
 
This reliance on individual ability in self-assessment and discipline is discredited “since 
only outside and independent bodies are able to monitor and oversee ethics rules and 
standards in a fair and impartial way” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 85). Independent bodies 
are expected to show greater objectivity and impartial judgement, and protect rights and 
institutional obligations, by being untainted by political or personal loyalties. They thus 
better guarantee public confidence. Nevertheless, the empirical findings show that 
holders of public office are not supportive of the introduction of the external 
mechanisms of control. They prefer the establishment of institutional self-control forms, 
internal reporting obligations and monitoring mechanisms. Despite such practices, there 
is widespread recognition of the viability of external committees’ monitoring capacities, 
and such direction is viewed to be forthcoming (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 85).  
 
“In the case of holders of public office (HPO) independent and outside control is 
rare. Mostly the different institutions (or HPO) control themselves – if at all. This 
current practice is not satisfying since only outside and independent bodies are 
able to oversee and monitor ethics rules and standards in a fair and impartial 
way” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 85).   
 
The negative side is that there is insufficient knowledge about the functions and powers 
of ethics committees or relevant ethic commissions. These are usually consulting bodies 
rather than fully fledged organisations with investigating and sanctioning capacities 
(Salminen et al., 2007, p. 86). It is interesting to discover such committees’ usefulness 
in effectively overcoming the problems related to conflict of interest. Despite the lack of 
empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of such bodies, the paper encourages 
their deployment, especially if their absence can be interpreted as support for the current 
model of self-regulation, which favours weak monitoring bodies (Salminen et al., 2007, 
p. 9). 
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Another problem that the policy recognises is a modern trend of introducing new forms 
of rules and standards that regrettably avoid the evaluation of already existing conflict 
of interest systems. “Success in implementation of new rules and standards is only 
possible if the different conflict of interest regulations are shaped to the needs of the 
specific administrative culture and political context” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 9). 
 
This discussion of regulation and standardisation brings the next focus under scrutiny.  
This is the concept of regulation density, which acquires central importance in the study 
(Salminen et al., 2007, pp. 106-107). ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of 
Public Office in the European Union’ thoroughly elaborates the principle of regulation 
density and related issues emanating from the historical legacies of European countries. 
This information gives a better understanding of the public administrative traditions 
inherited by member states and organisations, and allows parallels to be drawn between 
different approaches in conflict of interest matters. 
 
5.4.3 The Problem of ‘Overregulation’ 
 
The problem of ‘overregulation’ inverts the whole idea of control through the means of 
supervision and rule-following. ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public 
Office in the European Union’ (Salminen et al., 2007) points out that countries and 
institutions reach a point in their regulating activities where they find themselves to be 
overregulated despite the fact that they are insufficiently aware of daily practices in 
implementation, management and enforcement (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 107).  
 
The US and UK, where conflict of interest rules and effects are approached critically 
and are often at the centre of discussions, have greater control and monitoring 
mechanisms incorporated in their systems. In Europe, this issue has traditionally been 
less critically approached. Many experts relate this to cultural diversity. For example, 
Germany is seen to be least centred on conflict of interest issues, and ethics policy 
causes much less attention and debate there; some argue that this is due to its strong 
public service ethos in contrast with the US and UK (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 107). 
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In Germany, most senior officials come up through a legal administrative culture. The 
positive side of the lawyer monopoly of the holders of public office is their general 
awareness of existing rules and standards in the field of ethics. Other issues also play an 
important role: “traditionally German top-officials are less mobile (for example the 
practice of moving between the public/private sectors) than their US counterparts and 
face fewer ethical risks” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 207). 
 
Most ethics experts claim that strong ethics rules and regulations work contrary to the 
desired outcome of public trust and confidence. These critics (Antechiarico and Jacobs, 
Mackenzie, Stark, Saint-Martin, F. Thompson, Behncke, Bovens, etc.) argue that more 
ethical rules provide more prosecutions and investigations and reveal more allegations 
of unethical conduct that contribute little, if at all, to the reduction of publicity and 
public controversy on the subject. According to them, more rules increasingly 
undermine public trust and create more violations of ethics rules and the legitimacy of 
the institutions; this creates collective costs that outweigh the individual benefits. More 
rules and standards automatically result in and correlate with more violations of those 
rules. Therefore, the paper’s argument is that the visibility of unethical behaviour 
increases as a result, while at the same time public confidence in public institutions 
decreases. The appearance thus produced is contrary to the expected outcome (Salminen 
et al., 2007, pp. 108-109).  
 
Similar to Dobel’s  (2006, p. 16) and Boyce and Davids’ (2009) arguments about the 
importance of “political optics” (Boyce & Davids, 2009, p. 607) presented in the above 
section on the conflicts of interest literature, ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for 
Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ (Salminen et al., 2007) sees today an 
unequivocal tendency to be supportive of new regulations and rules in the field of 
ethical behaviour. The explanation is the political soundness of such a subject as an 
effective tool in an election campaign. The regulation of political ethics is popular 
today; therefore being in the opposing camp is risky from the political point of view 
(Salminen et al., 2007, p. 109). 
 
The study sees a positive correlation between the adoption of rules and regulations and 
the rate of corruption in a country. ‘The rules are introduced with the best intention, 
however, their implementation, management, monitoring, and enforcement is closely 
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dependent on the existence of necessary capacity and skills for this”(Salminen et al., 
2007, p. 110). The low level of corruption and bribery of the Scandinavian countries 
with their low level of regulation density is informative here. The hypothesis can be 
stated to be that “more regulations do not lead to less corruption. Instead, it seems that 
more regulation is not required in those situations or countries where high level of 
public trust exists” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 110). 
 
From this, two conclusions can be made: first, that there is no automatic link between 
strict rules and a low degree of corruption, and that a low degree of regulation density is 
compatible with a low number of conflicts of interest; and second, that this is not to say 
that countries with a high level of corruption and conflict of interest should have fewer 
rules in place (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 111). Modern conflict of interest issues 
concentrate on striking a balance between over-imposed regulations, individuals and 
organisational freedom and flexibility (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 113). 
 
The ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the public Service’ guideline (OECD, 2003) 
introduces a conflict of interest policy model mainly based on procedural rule-following 
and the introduction of rules and codes of conduct that define the obligations of public 
servants. Public entities are advised to introduce and uphold practices and procedures 
introduced there. The regulation density (Salminen et al., 2007) is quite extensive, albeit 
based on ‘soft’ instruments rather than ‘hard regulations’ (Salminen et al., 2007;  
OECD, 2003, pp. 33-37).  
 
The extent to which rules and regulations are introduced in a particular country is also a 
matter of historical legacy and conventions. ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for 
Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ contrasts two administrative legacies 
that to a large extent explain the different approaches supported by international 
organisations and States in their policy preferences.  In line with the emphasis of 
Critical Management Theory on the importance of historical legacies, Salminen and his 
colleagues adjudicate on this matter in their study. 
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5.4.4  “Roman Law” vs. “Common Law” Countries 
 
The particular administrative legacies on which most liberal-democratic states are built 
have an impact on the subsequent public administrative trends and models adopted by 
countries. Salminen and his colleagues researched two dominant traditions in detail, and 
related insights from their work are presented here.  
 
Traditionally countries with the “Roman Law” legacy more precisely regulate the status 
and conditions of civil servants than countries with a “Common Law” nature. 
Constitutions and legislations are the main bodies where corruption and ethics 
stipulations are regulated. Therefore, the ‘soft-law’ approaches are unnecessary 
complements to already properly functioning ‘hard-law’ models. The “strong public 
service ethics of acting in the public interest and fulfilling of ones duties 
administratively regulated the ‘Roman-Law’ countries”(Salminen et al., 2007, p. 124). 
Senior public servants often have a legal education and are much less mobile than their 
counterparts from the ‘Common Law’ tradition countries. Conflicts of interest are 
regarded to be sufficiently regulated, and bureaucratic features of the public service 
systems provide additional safeguards to positions that make the use of ‘soft 
instruments’ unnecessary (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 125). 
 
The ‘Common Law’ countries, such as the UK (the most ardent protagonist of the NPM 
model) are based on different system of ethics regulation. The ‘hard law’ is silent 
regarding the ethical role of civil servants and their status. The field of conflict of 
interest is almost entirely regulated through codes; this fact logically indicates that 
informal institutions and procedures are widely used in ‘soft regulation’ countries and 
are less popular in the ‘Roman Law’ tradition. In addition, a correlation can be made on 
the basis of the ‘Common Law’ countries’ adherence to the neo-liberal governmental 
rationale (Foucault (1991b)) and the ‘Roman Law’ countries’ softer social liberal or 
social-democratic orientation (Salminen et al, 2007, p. 125).   
 
Following this argument, the OECD’s history and traditional orientation can be 
attributed to the ‘soft regulation’ model, with interruptions in cases where ‘Roman Law’ 
expressions interfere with the mainstream. Such exceptions can be observed in 
‘European Principles for Public Administration’ (OECD, 1999), where EU 
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collaboration resulted in some expressions of ‘hard law’ because of the legacy from its 
oldest and largest members (e.g. Germany and France).  
 
Dostal argued that since the 1970s the OECD has relentlessly pursued neo-liberal 
economic norms. Market signals and rational actor assumptions have been sufficient for 
promoting valuable analysis in almost all fields of enquiry. ‘Particular knowledge’ 
which is a result of an expert’s enquiry on a particular political problem, and the 
‘general knowledge’ of the organisation, which is based on neo-liberal economic ideas, 
can often clash, with the latter always more authoritative and influencing the OECD’s 
policy advice (Dostal, 2004, p. 447). From time to time, there are more socially 
orientated policy proposals, as is the case with ‘inclusive liberalism’, (Craig & Porter 
2004) demonstrate, however, these are usually short lived initiatives, and the main 
stance of the organisation remains staunchly neo-liberal.  
 
Despite such historical adherence, traditional ‘Roman Law’ countries have started to 
undertake reform initiatives in the field of ethics. “Today, changing values, more 
mobility, public-private partnerships, more contracts between public and private sectors, 
the flexibility of career systems, the introduction of new public management 
instruments etc.” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 125) have had great impact on the 
reorientation of ethical approaches. Public service ethos and administrative conduct is 
more and more based on managerial thinking, performance, incentives, motivation and 
individual responsibility. No one proceeds without providing performance incentives, 
because public service ethics and duty ethics represent a performance ethic that is based 
not only on values, but also on material performance incentives. “Changing values, 
decentralisation and individualisation processes force especially the ‘Roman Law’ 
countries to adopt ‘soft-law’ approaches and offer more individual guidance and 
training (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 125). 
 
This tendency can also be discerned in political organisations such as the EU. Despite 
its historical roots lying in the ‘Roman Law’ model, new tendencies have weakened its 
traditional orientation. The combinatorial character of ‘European Principles for Public 
Administration’ can also be explained in these terms. On one hand, it introduces 
practices with the emphasis on economic efficiency and related developments; on the 
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other hand, such priorities still coexist with the principles inherited from the classical 
models of bureaucracy (OECD, 1999, pp. 21-24).  
 
From this follow accusations regarding abuses of public power and the 
maladministration of public resources, falling confidence in public administration in the 
eyes of citizens and taxpayers, blurred differences between the public domain of politics 
and the public domain of administration, administrative fragmentation and institutional 
obliteration, and a shortage in the pool of viable candidates for positions in the public 
employment system (OECD, 1999, p. 23; COM, 2001, p. 30; OECD, 2003, p.11; 
Salminen et al., 2007, pp. 7-8). 
 
5.5 How did the Representation of the Problem Come about?6 
 
Whereas the OECD’s guideline approaches the problem from government rationality 
(Foucault, 1991b in Bacchi, 2009, p. 29), based on purely neo-liberal economic 
underpinnings, Salminen and his colleagues assume that this approach is 
counterproductive (Salminen et al., 2007, pp. 13-14).    
 
The OECD’s conflict of interest guideline’s implicit problem representation tries to 
retain the status quo in public administration despite the growing evidence of 
conflict of interest cases. The problem is dealt with instrumentally, along the lines of 
the established systemic framework. The conflict of interest model should be suitably 
adjusted within this structure.  
 
‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ 
sees a deficiency in such instrumental approaches to the problem of conflict of interest.  
 
“When considering all the existent levels of regulation and the use of the variety 
of soft and legally binding instruments, it is no surprise that in the field of 
conflicts of interest, Member States face increasing challenges as to the quality of 
existing rules, overlaps of rules, legal fragmentation and a lack of coherence of 
approaches. As this study shows, there is no shortage of rules and standards in the 
field of conflicts of interest. In fact, conflicts of interest are becoming more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!The!third!question!(Bacchi,!2009,!p.!86).!!!
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regulated but not necessarily better managed and enforced in many countries.” 
(Salminen et al., 2007, p. 13)  
 
“In the aftermath of serious scandal, concerns about guaranteeing integrity and 
about the appearance of integrity trumps efficiency. Rarely is the 
integrity/efficiency trade-off even considered. 
” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 13). 
 
As ‘Regulating Conflict of Interest for Holders of Public office in the European Union’ 
contends, “success in implementing new rules and standards is only possible if the 
different conflicts of interest systems are shaped to the needs of the specific 
administration, taking the particularities of the administrative culture and political 
context into account” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 9). 
 
Today, the mainstream disciplines and activities of management are mostly devoted to 
improving the managerial practices and functioning of organisations. Such management 
practices and theories unequivocally include the staple issues of management’s 
functional efficiency and effectiveness. Managers are routinely regarded as the sole 
carriers of rationality and initiative. The transfer of responsibility for the execution of 
policies to a class of well-trained technocrats is often regarded to be the main solution to 
diverse political, social and economic problems. However, Critical Management Study 
warns against images and ideals of ‘professional management’ which emphasise the 
skilled employment of neutral and objective techniques. This technocratic 
understanding of knowledge and social affairs conceal the political nature of what is 
seemingly neutral or technological. There are hidden dangers that technocracy can 
impose problems for human autonomy and responsibility. Emphasis should be placed 
on overseeing the effects of managerial actions on the wider, politico-economic 
institutional arrangements that operate to steer and constrain, as well as enable, 
managerial action (Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, p. 8). 
 
The ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service’ guideline (OECD, 2003) is a 
vivid example of mainstream managerial theory, which is characterised by the 
wholesale use of the tools of ‘technocratic management’ (Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, 
p. 8).  It is based on such priorities as personal responsibility, instrumental application 
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of rules and statutes, mechanisms of monitoring and control, supervision entrusted in 
managers’ ability to assure colleagues of the importance of being ethical and that by not 
doing so they are personally answerable for repercussions. Public-private partnerships 
and intersection and mobility are welcomed. Culture is seen to be created and upheld by 
the manager, who develops and sustains the needed environment for ethical behaviour 
through the means of training, meeting, persuasion and personal example. 
Organisational culture is developed through preventive measures and positive 
enforcement properly endorsed to the organisation’s legal, institutional and procedural 
frameworks. At the same time, mechanisms that are incorporated in lobbying and 
partnerships with the private sectors are rather similarly based on personal cognitive 
capacities, accountability and some standard auditing of behaviour for integrity (OECD, 
2003, pp. 27-36), the workability of which in real lobbying situations, or even in normal 
administrative conditions, is continuously questioned.  
 
There is no attempt to reconsider the instrumental principles borrowed from business 
management practices in order to accommodate it to the domain of public governance, 
where traditionally the interests of the public have been given priority. What priorities 
serve the practices introduced in this document today? What kind of safeguards should 
be incorporated that will prepare a better foundation for withstanding the emerging 
expressions of conflict of interest? According to the text of ‘Managing Conflict of 
Interest in the Public Service’ (OECD, 2003), the reasonable person should be guided 
by the ‘balancing’ principle, which reconciles public, organisational, employee and 
business interests with each other (OECD, 2003, p. 18). Even if this is possible, the idea 
is not entertained further, what is unsurprising, given its nebulous character.  
 
‘Regulating Conflict of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ 
(Salminen et al., 2007), as mentioned above, is in line with the arguments of Critical 
Management Study. It questions the pure instrumental approach of managerialism in 
relation to the problem of conflict of interest. It is concerned with the suitable 
contextual environment that is viable for the accommodation of policies directed 
towards resolution of the problem. Salminen and his colleagues argue that in order for 
the code of conduct to fulfil its purpose, a viable network of engagement should be in 
place first. The authors argue that codes of ethics are essential at certain times and for 
certain purposes, but more is needed. Codes only work when they encompass people’s 
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existing beliefs and practices that are well designed, understood and supported by those 
who have an “atmosphere of trust” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 14).  
 
5.6 What is Left Unproblematic? Can the ‘Problem’ be thought about 
Differently?7 
 
The contextual change in European public administration, accompanied by the 
enlargement of the EU, has pushed the European institutions, together with the Member 
States, to reconsider existing arrangements, especially in the field of governance. The 
persistence of conflict of interest cases there, (despite their existence in other fields and 
sectors as well), is thought of as a deficiency to be resolved in order to restore the public 
image of those institutions and governments. However, comparing European contextual 
features of administrative mores and principles with the conflict of interest policies of 
the same period, and a little later, draws an ambivalent picture. 
 
How is the problem of conflict of interest represented by the OECD and EU? And how 
consistent are they with the broader EU administrative framework?  First, the two 
conflict of interest papers analysed here can be divided into two divergent approaches to 
the problem. One is instrumental, or as Critical Management Study calls it, technocratic 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2003, p. 8), in line with the mainstream managerial schools of 
thought, and the other can be called comprehensible. It approaches the problem all-
inclusively and questions all of the models that are based on instrumental approaches, in 
line with the Critical Management Theory tradition. Second, both of these papers are 
difficult to reconcile with the contextual characteristics of European governance, at least 
as drawn by the data introduced here.  The ‘Management of the Conflict of Interest in 
the Public Sector’ guideline’s policy model can be adjusted to the European public 
administration if the professional civil service standards are based on the same 
fundamental principles.  This is not the case, as already discussed above: so there is 
friction between the priorities of the conflict of interest guideline and the core European 
administrative principles. Despite this dichotomy, there are points of attachment, such 
as the devolution of the principle of collective accountability to the personal 
responsibility of civil servants, and the stress on efficiency and effectiveness in their 
operations. Nevertheless, separation between a public sphere and a private sphere, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!Bacchi!(2009,!p.!89).!
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separation between politics and administration, job protection, stability in pay, etc. 
(OECD, 1999, p. 21) are principles that are difficult to reconcile with the OECD 
guideline’s stress on mobility between sections, public/private overlaps, partnerships, 
lobbyism and so on (OECD, 2003).  
 
“Improving the performance of the public administration means seeking better 
standards of efficiency and effectiveness within the rule of law. This usually 
requires delegation and devolution of responsibilities in favour of public 
managers, accompanied by ex ante and ex post control mechanism. In such 
situation the quality of public managers becomes of the utmost importance” 
(OECD, 1999, p. 24). 
 
Third, ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public office in the European 
Union’ explicitly downgrades convergence models for widespread use across countries 
and different institutions and organisations, while both papers on European governance 
(OECD, 1999; COM, 2001) adjudicate the principle of convergence for the sake of 
simplicity and effectiveness. In this regard, the ‘Managing Conflict of Interest in the 
Public Service’ guideline does not see major obstacles to the standardised application of 
policy models, albeit recognising “the importance of the specific national contexts for 
policy application, therefore it provides a comprehensive reference model for public 
institutions seeking to ensure integrity in public decision-making” (OECD, 2003, p.14).   
 
The factor that is made clear in ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public 
Office in the European Governance’ is the importance that this study gives to the right 
contextual environment. 
 
“Codes of ethics are essential at certain times and for certain purposes, but more 
is needed. Codes only work when they encompass people’s existing beliefs and 
practices and are well designed, understood and supported by those who have to 
apply them in their daily lives. In addition, codes can only be effective in an 
atmosphere of trust. A well functioning democracy cannot survive without 
citizen trust and confidence in those who govern. Thus, behaviours or acts by 
officials that diminish citizen trust and confidence are a direct threat to 
democratic governance. While trust is a renewable resource, it is much easier to 
destroy than to renew. Many factors can destroy trust in governmental 
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institutions. However, none may destroy trust easier or faster than unethical 
behaviour or blatant corruption of public officials” (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 14).   
 
Then how can the problem be thought about differently? And where are the possible 
silences? Salminen and his colleagues see the introduction of independent ethic 
committees and commissions, as fully fledged organisations with prosecution 
capacities, to be one possible remedy for resolving the conflict of interest problem 
(Salminen et al., 2007, p. 9). However, it is less clear how such bodies should also 
provide the atmosphere of trust, due to the lack of empirical evidence or studies 
investigating this matter.  
 
However, the views of other authors who may partly give alternative answers to the 
above stated question can be brought in here. The traditional values upon which the 
civil service was built, at least in western democratic systems, incorporated norms that 
upheld an ideal of socialisation (Aucoin, 1994, p. 26), which is the underpinning force 
for institutional integrity. Aucoin believed that informal socialisation was the main 
component which helped the values of public service to continue to be consolidated 
(Aucoin, 1994, p. 26).  
 
For such an ethical policy to be a viable alternative, it should not only be described in 
detail within the statutes and legal documents, but also mutually shared by colleagues 
within a certain public sector domain.  Aucoin argued that “recommendations, 
communications, teamwork, respect, trust, reciprocal expectations, and group-
enforcement of norms - in short collegiality – are the hallmarks of a professional 
organisation, even when a hierarchy of offices are required for constitutional and 
administrative purposes” (Aucoin, 1994, p. 38).  
 
 ‘European Principles for Public Administration’ (OECD, 1999), albeit recognising the 
importance of a centrally managed professional body claims that the values that such a 
body is infused with are mutually exclusive. The principle of collective accountability 
(OECD, 1999, p. 21) is discounted from the administration of public affairs, and its 
alternative of individual responsibility exercised by managers is taken to be important in 
developing an ethical organisational context. However, due to the persistence of 
maladministration within the realm of public governance, the failure of such 
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instrumental means and practices in the effective resolution of administrative 
deficiencies is considerable. “The lack of collective action and self-defeating 
opportunism depends on the broader social context within which any game is played” 
(Gregory, 1999, p. 64).  
 
5.7  Alternative models for consideration 
 
How can representation of the ‘problem’ be questioned, disrupted and replaced? 
(Bacchi, 2009, p. 93).  One possible model that can be tried in relation to the 
phenomenon of conflict of interest can be based on the main principles and norms of 
Critical Management Study; for instance, the holistic approach. There, the context is 
paramount: first the focus should be placed on the middle level of analysis (Thompson, 
2005, p.274), in an organisational domain where hierarchically administered principles 
such as the chain of command is still preserved, and a clear organisational image in the 
form of norms, principles, customs, traditions and practices is sustained. Second, all 
policies that are thought to resolve ethical questions, such as cases of conflict of 
interest, should be properly accommodated within the larger organisational norms and 
principles. In other words, any policy design should be symbiotically matched with the 
wider organisational features and principles, especially in cases where the ethical 
dimension of an organisation’s functioning and operations is of concern. Furthermore, 
an attempt can be made to redirect the focus of the conflict of interest policy from 
personal/individual responsibility into organisational/ collective accountability without 
breaking the contextual compatibility addressed above. 
 
Albeit there is an implicit understanding that the status quo arrangements are 
fundamental, and the wholesale ideological shifts are less expected and even desirable, 
policies which deal with ethical problems in public governance should take the 
particularities of public administration, and traditional safeguards with much care.  
 
What effects are produced by this representation of the problem? (Bacchi, 2009, p. 
92). On the basis of comparison made between the conflict of interest data and the 
broader contextual development in the public governance of EU, the conclusion can be 
made that they produce counterproductive effects. Mainstream managerial practices 
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may have a good application within certain sectoral interests, especially in the private 
sphere, but their application in the domain of public administration is very complicated. 
Under the current mode of governance, the standards of public accountability have 
become instrumental in nature, especially in terms of an over-emphasis on procedural, 
economic criteria (e.g. efficiency and productivity), rather than substantive public 
concerns (e.g. equality and representation) (Hague, 2000, p. 602).  
 
Public management reforms at the international level were promoted by institutions that 
have as their primary mission economic development and globalisation, not 
management for its own sake (Mathiasen, 2007, p. 21).  
 
Adherence to the accepted values is of utmost importance in keeping the correct course. 
Individualism is one such key concept, and the importance of the individual in resolving 
all ethical problems produces discursive effects (Bacchi, 2009, p. 40) that obliterate 
other developments. Here the CMT principle of denaturalisation is informative: it sees 
this denaturalisation norm as being a characteristic feature of mainstream managerial 
theories that disqualify other imperatives (Fournier & Grey, 2000, p. 18).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus, how do the OECD and EU represent the problem of conflict of interest? And how 
consistent are they with the broader EU administrative framework? Both papers 
represent the problem of conflict of interest diversely, and the contextual characteristics 
of European governance are in dissonance with the policy recommendations of the 
researched documents. 
 
From the analysis undertaken above, key arguments can be moulded. There are two 
important factors: the first is the compatibility of the conflict of interest policy models, 
and the second is the contextual receptivity. The domain should be ready for the suitable 
accommodation of the chosen model. This in turn means that ready-made models would 
not be viable answers to resolve conflict of interest. The desired outcome can be 
difficult to achieve without the necessary contextual activators. For example, while the 
European public sector (OECD, 1999; COM, 2001) tries to define the appropriate 
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administrative context through the mores and principles that uphold the convergence 
model, such contextual ground is less welcoming to a viable conflict of interest policy. 
Thus, the resolution of the conflict of interest in both papers examined is ideologically 
and practically mutually contradictory. Whereas the ‘Management of the Conflict of 
Interest in the Public Service’ guideline (OECD, 2003) can be more or less adjusted to 
the European space (at least, the model can be uniformly incorporated through Member 
States’ administrations by means of convergence), ‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for 
Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ (Salminen et al., 2007) is less 
supportive of such an accommodation.  
 
‘Regulating Conflicts of Interest for Holders of Public Office in the European Union’ 
approaches the problem all-inclusively, in line with Critical Management Study. It 
questions all the ready-made suggestions concerning the conflict of interest 
phenomenon. For example, the instrumental approach that defines the problem as one to 
be remedied through the constant application of rules and regulations is downgraded, 
due to the empirical evidence, which shows no correlation between ethical probity and 
density of rules, codes and regulations (Salminen et al., 2007, pp. 7-10). This work is 
careful in its assumptions about best possible models for application. It not only 
recognises the particularities of public administration as a sector with its own 
characteristic and traditional forms of organisation, but it also stipulates the necessity of 
using approaches that are specially designed for each organisation and institution. 
Culture is recognised to be one of the key determinants for the context, without which 
regulations such as codes of conduct and disclosure procedures lose their reasonable 
application (Salminen et al., 2007, p. 9).  
 
Therefore a viable conflict of interest policy cannot be modelled without already having 
a strong contextual foundation in place. Organisational changes are difficult to sustain 
without a strong ethical foundation and solid infrastructure. Recent developments in 
public service administration are in line with economically sounded paradigms. They 
rarely include visions for a long time frame.  Alternatively, future-orientated, holistic 
approaches would revolve instead around different incentives than they do now.   
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